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Prologue: Economic Lamarckism? 
Jean-Baptiste Pierre Antoine de Monet, Chevalier de Lamarck was a 
French 19
th century naturalist. His claim to fame rests upon his idea that 
acquired traits could be inherited. Lamarck's theories suggested that the 
strengthened, or weakened traits, as the case might be, would be inherited 
by the offspring of parents, who shared this strength or weakness. Thus 
there were two aspects of the theory. 1) That environmental influences 
could influence the development of traits and 2) that these traits would be 
inherited by following generations. 
Others followed Lamarck up the blind alley of this theory. Among them 
a Viennese biologist Paul Kammerer. He forced toads that would normally 
mate on land to mate in water for several generations. He then asserted that 
he had observed that the males over time developed small dark pads on 
their feet that would help them get a grip on the female toad in the water. 
These pads would be inherited by the following generations. These obser-
vations seemed to confirm Lamarck’s theory. Alas the dark pads turned out 
to be made artificially using ink, and thus his life ended in scandal. In the 
meantime though his results were received with enthusiasm in the Soviet 
Union. Here Trofim Lysenko had made similar experiments with seeds. 
Apparently he tried to make seeds adapt to a cold climate by exposing gen-
erations of the seed to cold, asserting that the seeds would become adapted 
to cold conditions and that this adaptation would be inherited by succeed-
ing generations of the seed.  
Of course Lamarck’s  theories had already been discredited by Mendel 
and Darwin and their followers who dismissed the idea that an organism 
could acquire traits by being subjected to certain environment and that such 
traits could be inherited by the next generation.  
Apart from some very special cases this would not work in biology, but 
perhaps this is what we are observing in economics, in essence seeing 
Lamarckism at work in society.  
Could it be that an environment based upon the view of man found in 
economics, together with other fundamental assumptions of economics, 
would make people adapt to these assumptions? By forcing people to act in 
the environment of limited and perhaps unreal economic assumptions they 
adapt to these assumptions and begin to act according to them, developing 4 
for instance bigger and bigger dark splotches of self-interested and egotisti-
cal behaviour, that would in effect cover otherwise existing other-regarding 
sentiments and motives. Assumptions of self-interest would let that capa-
bility swell while the disuse of values and less self-interested behaviour 
would shrink and shrivel. 
This ideology would then become part of culture that would almost in a 
Lamarckian way be inherited by the next generations, while other-regard-
ing behaviour would wither away to nothing over generations. 
While subscribing neither to the natural selection nor to the Lamarckian 
view in economics, I am interested to see whether economics and economic 
assumptions shape our views and activities in practice, and if they do, it in 
what way they do this. Whether a belief in certain economic assumptions 
and theories in fact make these assumptions come true.  
And so, without further ado off to the real world of unreal economic as-





Economics imitating science? 
When Hayek held his Nobel Prize lecture in 1974 he scorned the pretence 
of knowledge in economics, and generally argued that economists in their 
recommendations have made a mess of things.
1  
The pretence of knowledge in economics is a result of the attempt by 
economists to “imitate as closely as possible the procedures of the bril-
liantly successful physical sciences - an attempt which in our field [eco-
nomics] might lead to outright error.”
2 He describes this attempt as a 
“scientistic attitude.” An attitude he calls decidedly unscientific in as much 
as it “involves a mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought 
to fields different from those in which they have been formed.” 
The problem with such an attempt to emulate the physical sciences, and 
may we add mathematics, in the social sciences is in general that in the 
social sciences we are dealing with complex phenomena, where it is diffi-
cult or impossible to account for all the different aspects and relationships. 
Hayek talks of phenomena of organised complexity, which means that we 
are dealing with phenomena which depend not only on the properties of the 
individual elements of which they are composed and their relative frequen-
cy, “but also on the manner in which the individual elements are connected 
with each other.” 
In contrast to physics, where one might generally assume that the im-
portant aspects can be accounted for. Thus in physics “the investigator will 
be able to measure what, on the basis of a prima facie theory, he thinks im-
portant, in the social sciences often that is treated as important which hap-
pens to be accessible to measurement.” Whereupon those who are sworn to 
regard only quantitative data as scientific “happily proceed on the fiction 
that the factors which they can measure are the only ones that are relevant 
… the confidence in the unlimited power of science of science is only too 
often based on the false belief that the scientific method consists in the ap-
                                          
1 Here it might be important to bear in mind that Hayek had spent part of his life criticizing the 
attempts to somehow intelligently manage the economy, through grand schemes or otherwise. 
See for instance: Hayek, F. A. (1976). Individualism and Economic Order. London: Routledge 
and Kegan. 
2 Hayek, F. A. v. (1974). Friedrich August von Hayek – Prize lecture, Nobelprize.org: 
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1974/hayek-lecture.html 6 
plication of a ready-made technique, or in imitating the form rather than the 
substance of a scientific procedure, as if one needed only to have to follow 
some cooking recipes to solve all social problems.”
3  
Hayek  is not alone in his critique. In the late  1980’s Mirowski criti-
cized neoclassical economics for similar reasons.  He points out that they 
were not just inspired by physical models. “The further one digs, the 
greater the realization that those neoclassicals did not imitate physics in a 
desultory or superficial manner; no, they copied their models mostly term 
for term and symbol for symbol and, said so.”
4 If he is right it must be rele-
vant to ask what implications the attempt to imitate as it were 19
th century 
physics has had for later developments in economics and the in social sci-
ences in general. 
In 1866 Jevons was one of the first to argue the case for the use of 
mathematics in economic theory in his “Brief Account of a General 
Mathematical Theory of Political Economy”. In his theory of economy he 
proposed to reduce the main problem of economics to a mathematical form. 
“Economy, indeed, being concerned with quantities, has always of neces-
sity been mathematical in its subject, but the strict and general statement, 
and the easy comprehension of its quantitative laws has been prevented by 
a neglect of those powerful methods of expression which have been applied 
to most other sciences with so much success.” Still, Jevons was only talk-
ing about the theory of economy. He did not think that economy in practice 
would become a matter of rigorous calculation: “Its mathematical princi-
ples may become formal and certain, while its individual data remain as 
inexact as ever.”
5 
Jevons was certainly not alone in the effort to contribute to a mathe-
matical economic theory. Edgeworth
6 and  Walras
7 come to mind. In his 
                                          
3 Hayek, F. A. v. (1974). Op. Cit. 
4 Mirowski, P. (1989). More Heat than Light, Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature's 
Economics: Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics (1999 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Chapter 1. 
5 Jevons, W. S. (1866). Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of Political Economy. 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, London, XXIX June, 282-287. Here quoted from 
http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/jevons/mathem.txt 
6 See for instance Edgeworth, F. Y. (1879). The Hedonical Calculus. Mind, 4(15), 394-408.  
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1881). Mathematical Psychics. London: Paul Kegan. 
Apparently Marshall was critical of Edgeworth attempts to show that “mathematical reasonings 
are possible without numerical data” (Marshall, A. (1881). Review of Edgeworth's 
Mathematical Psychics. The Academy, 457). 7 
“Mathematical Psychics” Edgeworth attempted to illustrate the possibility 
of “mathematical reasoning without numerical data.”  In the US Fisher con-
ducted a mathematical investigations into the theory of value and prices
8 in 
the 1890’s. 
Weintraub emphasizes in his “How Economics Became a Mathematical 
Science”
9 that their approach was physicalist approach with an emphasis on 
modelling the physical reality. These economists were still engaged in 
“truthtelling.”  Fisher fittingly used a physical machine with pumps and 
levers to illustrate his theory of price.  
Later the mathematical sophistication of economics went from 
truthtelling to mathematics based upon formalism.  In his “General 
Theory” Keynes was critical of the mathematical formalism: “It is a great 
fault of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods of formalising a system of 
economic analysis ... that they expressly assume strict interdependence 
between the factors involved and lose all their cogency and authority if this 
hypothesis is disallowed; whereas, in ordinary discourse,  where we are not 
blindly manipulating but know all the time what we are doing and what the 
words mean, we can keep 'at the back of our heads' the necessary reserves 
and qualifications and the adjustments which we shall have to make later 
on  ...”
10  
After the Second World War economy theory saw the rise of the so-
called Bourbakist school with ultra-formal mathematical theory. Weintraub 
sees Gérard Debreu
11 as a prominent figure in the attempt to place 
economics in a procrustes bed of axiomatic mathematical economics. 
Axiomatic meaning that the mathematical economics was seen as com-
                                                                                                                           
7 Walras, L. (1874). Éléments d'économie politique pure, ou théorie de la richesse sociale 
(Elements of Pure Economics, or the theory of social wealth) (W. Jaffé, Trans. 1954 ed.). 
Homewood, Ill: Richard D. Irwin. Walras extended the "marginalist" or "Neoclassical" theories 
into a mathematical general equilibrium theory. 
8 Fisher, I. (1892). Mathematical investigations in the theory of value and price, (1965 ed.). New 
York: A. M. Kelley. 
9 Weintraub, E. R. (2002). How Economics Became a Mathematical Science (ed.). Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
10 Keynes, J. M. (1937). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. In The 
Collected Writings of J. M. Keynes (1973 ed., Vol. VII. London: Macmillan, p. 297. 
11Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium 
(1971 ed.). New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press. p. x. In this theory Debreu distilled Neo-
Walrasian theory into a pure axiomatic form. 8 
pletely separated from any physical model, being in other words purely 
formal. 
In a foreword to Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic 
Equilibrium from 1959 Debreu states “The theory of value is treated here 
with the standards of rigor of the contemporary formalist school of mathe-
matics,” and later “Alliance to rigor determines the axiomatic form of 
analysis where the theory, in the strict sense, is logically disconnected from 
its interpretation.”  
Idiots savants 
Strangely enough it was Debreu himself who later took up some of the 
concerns relating to the formalization of economics. In a presidential 
address to American Economic Association in 1990 he argued: “The list of 
advances that the mathematization of economic theory helped or permitted 
is already long; and in one aspect it may appear lengthy. Ceteris paribus, 
one cannot prefer less to more rigor, lesser to greater generality, or com-
plexity to simplicity; but other things are not equal, and in the estimate of 
many members of our Association the cost of that mathematization some-
times outweighs its benefit.”
12 The  rigor of mathematical economics might 
if it pursued rigorously  develop into a rigor mortis.  
In 1988 a US Commission on Graduate Education in Economics (COGEE) 
was appointed as a response to criticism that economics as taught in gradu-
ate schools in the US was becoming divorced from the problems found in 
the real world. “The commission’s fear is that graduate programs may be 
turning out a generation with too many idiots savants, skilled in technique 
but innocent of real economic issues.”
13 
In 1991 the commission published its findings and recommendations. 
The findings indicated that there were a number of serious concerns, 
amongst these were  
 
                                          
12 Debreu, G. (1991). The Mathematization of Economic Theory. American Economic review, 
81(1), 1-7. 
13 COGEE (1991). Report of the Commission on Graduate Education in Economics. Journal of 
Economic Literature, xxix (September 1991), 1035-1053 9 
-  that tools and theory were emphasised in graduate school, while 
much less emphasis was placed on “creativity” and problem solv-
ing” 
-  that there was “an underemphasis on the “linkages” between tools, 
both theory and econometric, and “real world problems”
14 
 
In teaching the focus was shifting more and more to passing on tools and 
not questions. “We might teach the language of mathematics but not the 
logic of economics, and end up valuing the grammar of discipline, rather 
than its substance”. The emphasis on mathematics and the tools approach 
might prevent potentially good students from entering economics, while 
making those actually studying economics better technicians than good 
economists. The members of the committee cite examples of students who 
easily handled complicated mathematical models, but were stumbling over 
simple microeconomic problems in practice. “It appears that mastery of 
technique has supplanted mastery of the kind of intuitive economic analysis 
that once was called “Chicago-style micro”. 
The commission’s fears echo an uneasiness that the great economist, 
Alfred Marshall, felt in his later years. In his view “ … a good mathemati-
cal theorem dealing with economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be 
good economics.” Instead he recommended using the following rules: “(1) 
Use mathematics as a short-hand language, rather than as an engine of 
inquiry. (2) Keep to them till you have done. (3) Translate into English. (4) 
Then illustrate by examples that are important in real life. (5) Burn the 
mathematics. (6) If you can't succeed in 4, burn 3. This last I did often.”
15  
The COGEE commission was also concerned about the lack of creativ-
ity. In the report the worry was that the current forms of teaching may 
actually stifle creativity. I believe that this is an observation that may be 
correct for graduate teaching in other areas too. The emphasis is put on 
learning the models and methods of textbooks and not thinking critically 
about their explicit and implicit assumptions and practical relevance. Stu-
dents certainly learn to answer a limited set of questions for their exams, 
but can they handle problems in practice, are they able to ask pertinent 
questions and able to come up with pertinent answers to these questions?  
                                          
14 Ibid. p.1039. 
15 Pigou., A. C. (Ed.). (1966). Memorials of Alfred Marshall. New York: A. M. Kelley, p. 
427/28 10 
On the question of the writing and exposition skills the commission 
notes that too much jargon is used.  
In relation to research the commission finds that “ there are strong 
incentives for emulation rather than diversification.” Emulation and simi-
larity in research approaches are problematic as “Economic research is a 
social activity that typically progresses most rapidly in the hands of small 
groups of like-minded specialists who are not at all troubled if they are out 
of step with the profession as a whole.”  
The commission does not put forth any radical suggestions. What they 
seem to do is to recommend an adjustment of weights, a little less of this 
and a little more of that. It did not recommend a total change of the cur-
riculum, but recommended a better balance and more emphasis on real 
world application, for instance in the shape of field work. They also rec-
ommended a better balance of breath versus depth, mentioning that narrow 
selectivity might degenerate into idiosyncrasy, and at the same time advo-
cating for diversity in the approaches of the different departments. 
I wonder if that will do the trick, or whether some other forces are not 
stronger  than these simple recommendations. In my view the concerns 
seen by the commission are concerns that can be echoed just as well today 
and in most of the social sciences. 
Still, an upbeat article about the Berkeley Economics Department from 
1995
16 might indicate that something is happening, that the battle-cry has 
become: “Real-world economics,” referring to hot issues like jobs and 
wages, immigration policies, technology contribution to growth etc.  
Economists at the department of economics in Stockholm carried out a 
small survey
17 to see if they would find some of the same biases that the 
US commission had found, that students of economics would in fact have 
learned to amputate a leg, balancing on the remaining leg of mathematical 
and statistical methods. In their survey they indeed found the same ten-
dency already found in the states. It seems that it is implicitly assumed that 
once you master the models and methods you are in fact doing economics. 
There can be little doubt that this one-legged view colour the view of what 
is seen as the subject and method of economics. 
                                          
16 Vogel, T. T. (1995). The Berkeley Economics Department. Wall Street Journal(12/01). 
17 Boschini, A. D., Lindquist, M. J., Pettersson, J., & Roine, J. (2004). Learning to Lose a Leg: 
casualties of PhD Economics training in Stockholm. Econ Journal Watch, 1(2, Augus 2004), 
369-379. 11 
Luckily other developments may contribute to a loosening of the for-
malism like the advent of computers, simulations, behavioural economics,  
empirical research, and perhaps complexity theory.  I  wonder though if the 
recent interest in complexity theory
18 inaugurates a genuinely new interest 
in otherworldly models in economics and the rest of social science, or 
whether it represents a continuation of esoteric modelling with other 
means. 
 The self-love of the baker  
“The first principle of economics is that every agent is actuated only by 
self-interest.”
19. This is an assumption that can be followed back to Adams 
Smith of course and others who inaugurated modern economics. Such 
assumptions with their implicit lack of concern for the interest of others are 
supposed to be the driving force in economy as we can see from the often 
quoted passage from Smith: "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, 
the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to 
their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their 
advantages."
20  
Sen see such individuals as rational fools. Talking about preference 
orderings he criticizes the view of the traditional economics: “A person is 
given one preference ordering, and as and when the need arises this is sup-
posed to reflect his interest, represent his welfare, summarize his idea of 
what should be done, and describe his actual choice and behaviour. Can 
one preference do all these things? A person thus described may be 
“rational” in the limited sense of revealing no inconsistencies in his choice 
behaviour, but if he has no use for these distinctions between quite differ-
ent concepts, he must be a bit of a fool. The purely economic man is indeed 
close to being a social moron. Economic theory has been much preoccu-
                                          
18 See for instance: Byrne, D. (1998). Complexity Theory band the Social Sciences: an 
introduction. London: Routledge.  
19 Sen, A. (1977). Rational Fools: A Critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4), 317-344, p. 317. 
20 Smith, A. (1776). The Wealth of Nations (1974 ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin. p. 119. 12 
pied with this rational fool decked in the glory of his one all-purpose pref-
erence ordering.”
21  
This rational moron may be found in Becker’s attempts to use economic 
assumptions and micro-economics to explain all sorts of behaviour, as for 
example in economics of marriage
22. The following remark is also ascribed 
to him: “A child you see, is much like refrigerator: it is expensive to pro-
cure, delivers a stream of returns over long periods of time, has imperfect 
second-hand values, and so forth.”
23  
I also wonder if it is not the same social moron we find lurking in the 
theories of public choice, as promulgated for instance by Buchanan.
24  
A small example ascribed to Sen may indicate that there is something 
wrong with theories that take such assumptions as their starting point. A 
stranger asks a local man for the direction to the railway station. The local 
self-interested economic man exclaims: “Certainly!” and points in the 
opposite direction of the railway station, towards the post office, “and 
would you be kind enough to post this letter for me at the post office on 
your way? The stranger: “Certainly!” and plans to open the letter on the 
way to see if it contains something worth taking. 
Neoclassical economics assume that our preferences and goals are 
somehow given. “The possibility that institutions, including markets, firms, 
families and schools, are as much a basis of preference formation as they 
are a reaction to given preferences, is left out of most accounts.”
25  
We do not possess the qualities of the economic man with all his 
knowledge and unlimited ability to calculate what maximises his or her 
utility.  We don’t even know what to calculate. What are our opportunities? 
What education should I choose? Where will I get a job? Should I invest in 
shares or bonds? Is it a good idea to by a house now? Should I buy this 
book instead of this? When thinking about day to day decisions I do not 
                                          
21 Sen, A. (1982). Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 99. 
22 Becker, G. S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human behavior. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
23 McCloskey, D. N. (1995). Op.cit.  
24 See for instance the James Buchanan Center for Political Economy http://www.gmu.edu/jbc/ 
See also:  
Buchanan, J. M., og G. Tullock. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, 1962.  
Buchanan, J. M. The Limits of Liberty — between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1975  
25 Ben-ner, A., & Putterman, L. (2000). Values Matter. World Economics, 1(1), 39-60, p. 39. 13 
believe that many see themselves as rational maximisers. We would not 
even know it if we somehow succeeded in achieving it. 
Our actions are influenced by a lot of things: habits, whims, the 
weather, the activities of others, exposure to persuasive commercials, sud-
den threats and opportunities over which we have no control. What this 
means is of course that the ideas and activities of others are important for 
our ideas and activities. Likewise the overall environment and changes in it 
may be important for us and for our ideas and activities. 
What a real decision maker would do according to McCloskey is to 
“converse with himself and others. Gossip, shoptalk, schmoozing, com-
mittees, reasoning, hallway conferences: these are the gust of capitalism.”
26 
It is not the simpleminded calculating machine in shape of economic 
man that has brought us progress. Instead it is the cunning, alert individual 
who can sense the potential in a vague new idea or grasp fleeting opportu-
nity coming to light in a conversation or practical activities. 
McCloskey insists that such alertness is not enough. Neither is the abil-
ity to judge correctly a new opportunity. What is needed is also ability to 
persuade others of the correctness. Whether it is new insight in economics 
or a new idea for a novel communication device. Others have to see, accept 
and adopt the idea. McCloskey and Klamer assert that as much as one 
quarter of GDP is persuasion
27. 
Economic autism 
The “language of modern economics, due to its demands for determinacy, 
crowds out questions of subjective assessment, institutional context, social 
embeddedness, knowledge (as opposed to information), judgment, entre-
preneurship, creativity, process, history etc.”
28 One may talk of the meta-
phors that economists live by: “When economists look at, say, childcare, 
they think of markets … By choice of metaphor the economists are driven 
to identify a demand curve, a supply curve, and a price. If they are of the 
                                          
26 McCloskey, D. N. (1995). Op.cit.  
27 McCloskey, D. N., & Klamer, A. (1995). One Quarter of GDP is Persuasion. Rhetoric and 
Economic Behavior, 85, 191-195. 
28 Boettke, P. J. (1996). What is wrong with neoclassical economics. Working paper New 
York: New York University p. 5. 14 
mainstream, they will see “rational” behavior in such a market.”
29 The 
metaphors make economist see and understand behaviour in certain way, a 
way that shapes the view of reality.  
Idiots savants, skilled in technique but ignorant of real economic issues, 
and remembering that idiots savant or learned idiots may have extraordi-
nary skills in certain very limited domains but cognitive deficiencies in 
most others. This description fit quite well with some of the diagnostic cri-
teria for autism as found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders
30. Criteria which include restricted repetitive and stereotyped pat-
terns of behaviour, interests and activities, as manifested for instance by 
 
-  encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and 
restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity or 
focus. 
-  apparently inflexible adherence to specific, non-functional routines 
or rituals. 
 
Autistic economics was precisely what a group of economics students 
from some of the more prestigious French institutions criticized in June 
2000. They published an open letter on the web to professors and others 
responsible for teaching this discipline
31. It began in a grand manner:  
We, economics students of the world, declare ourselves to be generally 
dissatisfied with the teaching that we receive. This is so for the following 
reasons: 
We wish to escape from imaginary worlds. The neoclassical theory 
being taught does not help us understand the economic phenomena which 
confront citizens of today. The empirical side of history, institutions and 
behaviour and strategies is missing.  
We oppose the uncontrolled use of mathematics. The treatment of 
mathematics as an end itself “leads to a true schizophrenia in relation to the 
                                          
29 McCloskey, D. N. (1995). Metaphors Economists Live By. Social Research, 62(2), 215-237, 
p. 215. 
30 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-IV-TR. (2000).Washington 
DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
31 Open letter from economics students to professors and others responsible for the teaching of 
this discipline. To be found at: http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/wsp.htm 15 
real world.” It might facilitate the construction of exercises and the grading 
of students but it does not concern itself with the real world. 
We are for a pluralism of approaches in economics. Lectures leave no 
place for reflection. Truth is axiomatic. The approach must be adapted to 
the big questions like unemployment, inequalities, financial markets, 
advantages and disadvantages of free-trade, globalization, economic devel-
opment, etc. 
Call to teachers: wake up before it is too late! Or you risk that students 
will lose interest in the subject. 
The open letter concluded: We no longer want to have this autistic sci-
ence imposed on us.  
The open letter led to more debate to involving established economists 
and led to the so-called post autistic economics movement. Arguments 
were collected in the publication of “The crises in economics”
32 and a post 
autistic economics newsletter was established. 
The closure of economics 
In June 2001, 27 Economics PhD students at Cambridge University fol-
lowed the example set by French economics students and published their 
own petition: “Opening up economics.”
33 The petition proposes opening up 
an economics that they assert is dominated by a single approach to expla-
nation and analysis. They argue that the general applicability of this 
approach is disputable, and that its dominance has some detrimental 
effects. 
“The dominance of the mainstream approach creates a social convention 
in the profession that only economic knowledge production that fits the 
mainstream approach can be good research, and therefore other modes of 
economic knowledge are all too easily dismissed as simply being poor, or 
as not being economics. Many economists therefore face a choice between 
using what they consider inappropriate methods to answer economic ques-
tions, or to adopt what they consider the best methods for the question at 
hand knowing that their work is unlikely to receive a  
                                          
32 Fullbrook, E. (Ed.). (2003). The Crisis in Economics. London: Routledge. 
33 Opening Up Economics: A Proposal By Cambridge Students, The Cambridge 27. (2001). 
Post-Autistic Economics Newsletter (7, July). 16 
hearing from economists.”
34  
I wonder if they are now talking about a phenomenon that in itself has 
nothing to do with a mathematical approach to economics or the canonical 
assumptions of economics, but more with social convention and dominance 
of certain schools of thought. Because this phenomenon of social conven-
tion and dominance is to be found everywhere in the social sciences and I 
presume, in any branch of scientific endeavour. 
In a comment on the open letter of the French students Galbraith tackles 
the problem of pluralism
35. In his example he states that mass unemploy-
ment can either be seen as a phenomenon of “imperfect labour markets, or 
a phenomenon of inadequate effective demand.” In the first view reducing 
real wage would be a solution, in the second one might instead support the 
income of those not adequately paid in the private markets. Galbraith then 
notes “…both cannot be correct” and notes that the view promulgated 
today has not been demonstrated to be more correct the other, it is merely 
asserted. 
This point is important in economics as well as in social science in gen-
eral. It may very well be difficult or impossible to demonstrate with cer-
tainty that one view is more “real” or “true” than another. Thus the domi-
nant view is difficult to rattle by a minority with a different view. A point 
already commented upon by Kuhn and Lakatos in their attempts to explain 
the stickiness of certain dominant modes of thought in the sciences. Kuhn
36 
talking about paradigms of thought modes and Lakatos
37 of a protected cas-
tle keep of beliefs, that is preserved even when the outer defences have 
fallen. 
It seems that what is important is the fit between a certain model, a cer-
tain method and the dominant thought of the day. Not only with regard to 
theoretical models but also and perhaps more rigidly so, with regard to 
what may be seen as the scientific approach.
38  
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Debreu makes a similar argument in his later years. “The reward system 
of our profession reinforces the effects of that autocriticism. Decisions that 
shape the career of an economic theorist are made by his peers …[and] 
their verdicts will not be independent of their own values. An economist 
who appears in their court rarely ignores his perception of those values. If 
he believes that they rate mathematical sophistication highly, and if he can 
prove that he is one of the sophisticates, the applause that he expects to 
receive will condition his performance. The same effects are also amplified 
by the relentless pressure to publish exerted by his environment.”
39  
Thus the Cambridge students may very well have touched upon a very 
important dilemma for social scientists today. Using either inappropriate 
methods to analyse, understand and explain phenomena, which might in 
fact be difficult to do with these methods. Or giving up the pretence of sci-
entific approach and opting for what one may believe is an appropriate 
approach that will help provide better insight, but which will be seen as 
unscientific by the dominant view.  
Statistics of no significance and revealing no insight 
This is a thought that struck me a few years ago when asked to review a 
journal submission about ethics characterised by one-sided or is it one-
legged emphasis on the methods used. I found cause to write the following 
to the editor of a journal. 
“It strikes me […] that proposals like these seem to have become more 
commonplace. It is as if the use of an accepted tool, in the shape of some 
statistical analysis, makes a paper scientific even in the evident absence of 
any deeper theoretical insight. I wonder whether this isn’t becoming a gen-
eral problem. It would mean that the use of a statistical tool (the method) is 
becoming more important than the problem or the insight into a theoretical 
background. As I see it, this isn’t a paper about ethics, it is more a demon-
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39 Debreu, G. (1991). Op. Cit. 18 
stration of simple statistical tools, and that in itself might in certain sense 
be ethically questionable.” 
These comments echo what Kruskal wrote many years ago. “There are 
some other roles that activities called “statistical” may, unfortunately, play. 
Two such misguided roles are (1) to sanctify or provide seals of approval 
(one hears, for example, of thesis advisors or journal editors who insist on 
certain formal statistical procedures, whether or not they are appropriate); 
(2) to impress, obfuscate, or mystify.”
40  
In a lengthy paper from 2004 McCloskey and Ziliak look at the use of  
regression analysis in papers published in the American Economic Review 
during the decade from 1990 to 2000 repeating an investigation they had 
carried out for the 1980’s. Among other things they investigated whether 
the authors of the papers distinguished between the  economic or political 
significance of the analysis and the statistical significance.  To their dismay 
they found that most authors did not make this distinction. “82% of the 
empirical papers published in the 1990s in the American Economic Review 
did not distinguish statistical significance from economic significance […]. 
In the 1980s, 70% did not—scandalous enough.”
41 
This is a question of the widespread use and perhaps uncritical applica-
tion of statistical tools in analysis. One might also fear that the insight in 
the underlying causes for the observed phenomena may count for less and 
less in the attempt to demonstrate statistical method dexterity. 
Lawson mentions that the aims of science in general is not the “produc-
tion of an event regularity per se.” It is in fact to identify and understand 
the causes of observed regularities. “medical researchers are not interested 
correlating the temperature of a patient with the intensity or location of 
spot’s on the patient’s body, but with identifying (and counteracting) the 
virus or cause behind the symptoms.”
42 Today I fear that in interest of 
fulfilling demands for evidence-based-medicine doctors may actually be 
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interested in these correlations, losing sight of the relevant but also more 
difficult questions of establishing and understanding causes. Thus the focus 
on quantitative methods in the interest of scientificness may actually turn 
one’s gaze away from the deeper causes.  
One wonders how a modern economist standing in the Tower of Pisa 
like a Galileo would go about the imaginary experiment of letting lead 
weights and feathers fall to ground?
43 Using advanced instruments he 
might be able to establish the different speeds with which lead weight and 
feathers fall to the ground. Later he might publish an article on “The rela-
tive fall velocity of lead weights and feathers.” Would it be interesting? 
Perhaps as much as many studies in economics today. The observations of 
the would-be Galileo economist would certainly not provide us with much 
in insight into the forces that govern the free fall. 
We may somehow feel that Galileo’s and Newton’s insight is somehow 
more important scientifically than the regularities in relative fall velocities 
of lead weights and feathers in the air. 
A four-fold critique 
What we have seen so far leaves us with a fourfold critique of economics 
and perhaps also the social sciences in general.  
First we have what we may see as the problem of scientism. We have 
the findings of the COGEE commission and others who see it as a problem 
that economic theory becomes too mathematical oriented. Thereby moving 
economic theory away from real world problems and distilling into finer 
and finer spirits of esoteric models. In fact aspiring to become mathemati-
cal economics.  
Secondly we have the very simple and narrow assumptions underlying 
the models used in economics. Not the least with regard to the nature of 
man, whether it be the traditional economic assumptions that Sen is 
attacking or the more sophisticated versions. Assumptions that do not con-
cern themselves with the historical development of human societies or the 
actual behaviour of living human beings in a society. 
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Thirdly there is the overall problem that schools of thought become self-
disciplining, self-protecting and self-sufficient, making them immune to 
criticism and the possibility of alternative views, approaches and explana-
tions. 
Finally there is the problem of technique found in the reliance on quan-
titative methods in the shape of an array of sophisticated statistical tools, 
for analysing real world phenomena. These tools may provide us with a 
wealth of data but perhaps very little insight and understanding. 
In the following we will focus on a discussion of the simple and narrow 
assumptions and the possible consequences of a view of man based upon 
these assumptions. In the course of this discussion we may have cause to 
take up the other “folds” of the critique. 
Are we really resourceful, evaluative maximisers? 
A more sophisticated moron than simple economic man, or perhaps a less 
dismal view of the nature of man, may be found in the shape of the 
Jensen’s and Meckling’s REMM view
44 of the nature of man. With a name 
like that REMM men sound as if they may be members of an alien tribe in 
a Starship Enterprise episode.  
REMM’s are Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximising Models of man.  
REMM men are resourceful in being able to maximise utility to them-
selves, for instance by finding loop holes in laws that they might exploit. 
Jensen and Meckling mention search for and creation of loopholes in tax 
laws.  
REMM men are evaluative and put value on knowledge, independence, 
plight of others, the environment, honour, interpersonal relationships, 
status, peer approval, group norms, culture etc, …but, and this is a big but, 
they are always willing to make trade-offs and substitutions and their pref-
erences are perfectly ordered.  
They are also maximisers who want to enjoy the highest level of value 
possible within the wealth, time and physical constraints. 
In short they are smart, but unscrupulous maximisers, ready to use every 
loophole available to their own advantage, and trade everything in order to 
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maximise their own satisfaction. It is only a question of price. REMM men 
can be bought. They are willing to give up anything they value, if they can 
just get enough of something else they value. Moral stance and love may be 
exchanged for a sufficiently large amount of some material goods that is 
also valued, like perhaps a big flat screen TV or a Porsche. Or a child per-
haps for a refrigerator? “The fact that all individuals make trade-offs (or 
substitute in virtually every dimension imaginable) means that there are no 
such thing as human “needs” […] There are only human wants, desires, or, 
in the economists language, demands.  
One may wonder how the individual REMM men get their valuations 
and demands. How did they ever come to care for others and how in the 
world did they ever create a society which somehow established moral 
norms, social rules and public regulation. Let’s hear what Jensen and 
Meckling have to say: “The REMM model explains the evolution of cus-
toms and mores as the reflection in habits, unquestioned beliefs, and relig-
ion of behavior patters that reflect optimal behavior given the cost of vari-
ous actions.”
45 What they are saying is in fact the REMM men come to 
value whatever is valued because that helps them maximise their own val-
ues. This would to have the smell of tautological explanation. It does not 
really explain how these values come about, why they are often shared and 
apparently difficult to change in practice. 
Values seem somewhat superficial and malleable in Jensen’s and 
Meckling’s version. When companies abandon a policy and cultural value 
of life long employment, forced by the circumstances, REMM men will 
change their values accordingly and respond positively to what is now 
being valued. Perhaps even policies like those of Jack Welch of GM-
fame
46, who certainly does not seem to have qualms about laying off peo-
ple. Now I wonder how far this might go, where our fancies might actually 
take us in order to maximise our values. There would seem to be no inher-
ent barrier to for example criminal activities, unless of course one is 
caught. To REMM men it might not be contrary to reason “to prefer the 
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.”
47 Nor would 
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it be contrary to reason “for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least 
uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me.”  
One might perhaps wonder first of all how the societies we are living in 
came about if we all act like unscrupulous morons, but that does not seem 
to be topic of interest in economics. Secondly one may wonder whether we 
might find a single economist who in his private life would want to live the 
life of social moron or a REMM. 
Wearing glasses of a certain neoclassical economics colour or being 
taught REMM models certainly taints the whole scene, perhaps making us 
see all human actions as self-interested. Even if we are not always able to 
see the selfishness directly we presume that it is there, even underneath 
apparent altruistic acts.  
Like Becker to whom the following remark ascribed: “A child you see, 
is much like refrigerator: it is expensive to procure, delivers a stream of 
returns over long periods of time, has imperfect second-hand values, and so 
forth.”
48  
In a small experiment Miller and Ratner
49 showed that the subjects tak-
ing part in the experiment tended to overestimate the self-interest in the 
attitudes and behaviour of others, while their own actions were not seen as 
primarily motivated by self-interest. Studies also indicate economics stu-
dents are more prone to ascribe self-interested motives to actions than say 
nurses.
50 
Miller notes: “The experience of taking a course in microeconomics 
actually altered student’s conceptions of the appropriateness of acting in a 
self-interested manner, not merely their definition of self-interest.”
51 This 
indicates that the canonical assumptions of economics in turn influence the 
views of its practitioners. Being taught the assumptions of neoclassical 
economics one might become prone to expect others to act in a self-inter-
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ested way. Studies by Frank et al indicate that this may in fact happen. Is 
that of any real concern, we are after all only talking about small experi-
ments? Their answer is that it should concern us “to the extent that norms 
favoring cooperation help solve the prisoner’s dilemma and other market 
failures, one cost of a rise in selfish behavior is a fall in the real value of 
economic output.”
52 What is even more disconcerting is that the assump-
tion of self-interested behaviour by others may cause a rise in self-inter-
ested behaviour in all of society. Especially if accompanied by the evident 
losses for those who play cooperative, making cooperation a loser’s choice.  
In a game we have called “Do ut des” we get results that would indicate 
that individuals may in fact to large degree act like REMMs’. In the game 
there are several simultaneous players, who play a number of rounds, 
where the number of repetitions is not specified in advance. In the game the 
players can win a sum of money in each round. 
The players have two possible strategies, they can choose either a C 
decision or a S decision
53. In table 1 we can see the payoff scheme for S 
and C for different combinations of 10 players. S and C columns show 
combinations of S and C decisions, while column 3 shows the individual 
payoff for players choosing S for different combinations of S and C deci-
sions. Column 4 shows the individual payoff for players choosing C for the 
same combinations of S and C. 
In every round participants are asked to make either an S or a C deci-
sion. They have to do it simultaneously, without discussing their choices 
with others, and keep their choice secret. After each round gains are dis-
tributed according to the scheme in table 1. A combination of 7 players 
choosing S and 3 players C would result in a payoff  of  2 units to each of 
the 7 S –players and 1 unit to every C-player. A combination with 1 S-
player and 9 C-players would result in a payoff  of 5 units to the S-player 
and 2 units to each of the 9 C-players. 
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Table. 1 Do ut des 
 





10  0  1  0 
9  1  1  0 
8  2  2  0 
7  3  2  1 
6  4  3  1 
5  5  3  1 
4  6  3  2 
3  7  4  2 
2  8  4  2 
1  9  5  2 
0  10  0  3 
 
In the play there will usually be a number of players making S-deci-
sions. Asking them why they chose S they usually argue that S-players gain 
more than C- players for every combination of S and C decisions. Rounds 
later the C-players discover that they get less than the S-players. Shifting 
their strategy to S the result will be that combinations creep upwards in the 
table round by round with more and more S-players. With everyone 
choosing a S-decision the payoff is 1 unit for each. 
Giving the players time for discussion some players may argue that it 
would be wiser if all players made a C-decision as every player would then 
win 3 units. Having the possibility to discuss they might all agree that in 
the coming rounds every one will make a C choice. The actual choices 
made are still secret though. The result is usually that one or more players 
will still choose an S strategy, hoping apparently that all the other suckers 
will choose C. With just one player choosing an S decision, the resulting 
payoff would then be 5 units for this one player. Having agreed to choose 
C some players apparently see their chance to maximise their own gain by 
acting like personified REMM men and play S instead. 
As a result C-players may revert to S decisions in later rounds, letting 
the combinations creep upwards in the table once more, and the payoffs 
becoming correspondingly smaller.  25 
What do these results show? Possible explanations are that we mistrust 
the others so that in order to win something we choose S. Payoffs for S 
being always above payoffs  for C, whatever the combination. Even real-
ising that they other players may be doing the same for the same reason, 
and thus lowering the payoff of each player. We see this as a general sign 
of distrust. 
Next we might also see the results as indicating that at least some of the 
players act like the proverbial REMM men, acting smart and unscrupulous, 
by first agreeing to a compact whereby every player would choose C and 
then gaining an extra advantage by ignoring the compact in the next round. 
Although we have not investigated this thoroughly it seems that if the 
game is played with nurses or librarians the players will soon agree to play 
C, and a majority, and in some cases everyone, will honour the agreement. 
Playing the game with managers the first rounds would usually show a 
majority of S-players. Even after discussions and a general agreement to 
make C decisions, there would always be S players and the game would 
often deteriorate with more and more players again making S decisions in 
the succeeding rounds. 
The results indicate that trusting each other to choose a solution that 
gives more to everyone and keeping verbal agreements, is not in general to 
be expected, except in a few cases where the players were librarians and 
nurses. 
It might be argued that this is just a game and that it in such a game is 
acceptable to try to gain more than the others, even though one may end up 
with a smaller absolute gain, than might otherwise have been the case. 
On the other hand traffic behaviour, tax avoidance behaviour, and other 
behaviour in practice may look like the behaviour found in this game. In 
practice we apparently act like REMM’s at least some of the time.  
What would happen if everyone acted like this all the time. Evidently 
there would be no trust, and with no trust, interactions with others would 
become rather cumbersome. This should make us realise that the economic 
man and the REMM view must the very least be embedded into something 
greater than self-interest. 
 It is worth noting though that in most of the games there would usually 
be players who would continue to make C decisions, apparently because 
they saw this as the right thing to do. Somehow they had come to hold val-
ues and beliefs that they thought important to uphold, even in a situation 26 
where it was evident that this would give a further advantage to the players 
choosing an S decision.  
What we see here seems to be the influence of some deeply rooted val-
ues and sentiments that apparently limit the activities of REMM-like 
behaviour in practice, at least for some individuals. 
REMM’s in action 
The free market is a logic driven by incentive and reward, anti-egalitarian, 
and darkly suspicious of altruism. To Sommers the logic of market contains 
no priorities, no values, no end, no purpose, … but “liberates the enormous 
energies contained within self-interest.”
54 
It is a logic that necessitates lean and mean production, the substitution 
of labour with capital, relocation of production to places with low labour 
costs, also known as social dumping, or to places with less stringent envi-
ronmental demands and/or less costly safety regulations. 
Every single producer is contributing to this logic, even though he or 
she may not like it. Even worse, they may feel that they have no alternative 
but to carry the logic even further, by looking for possibilities that may 
raise their effectiveness and efficiency compared to other producers or sell-
ers. The logic of the market forces individuals to behave in a REMM-like 
fashion whatever their own personal thoughts and values. 
Danish Crown, a company resulting from a merger of cooperative 
slaughterhouses announced with regret the closure of one their Danish 
slaughterhouses. Production was moved to Germany, where wage costs 
would be lower. Under the prevailing logic they argued that there was little 
else they could do.  
Later labour unions complained that Danish Crown was using underpaid 
Polish workers in its German slaughterhouse, and somehow this was not 
seen as quite acceptable.
55  
Another example might show us how REMM-like actions undermine 
public regulation. In 2004 the third largest Danish bank, Jyske Bank, was 
scolded publicly by the prime minister Fogh, for going very very far in 
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their attempt to use loopholes in the law to get 1.6 milliard kroner in tax 
deductions. The bank had bought back shares in the bank, in order to annul 
the shares, thereby distributing the value of these shares on the remaining 
shares. Thus raising the share price and making their shareholders happy. 
The bank then argued that they had suffered a loss on the annulled shares, 
having sold the shares originally for much less than they bought them back 
for. The difference in share price amounted to the 1.6 milliard kroner and 
now they wanted to deduct that sum from their earnings, thus in fact letting 
the tax payers in general contribute to an even higher share price.
56 They 
may have been influenced by shareholder thinking, and what better way 
than letting the taxpayer contribute to shareholder value.  
 The CEO of the bank argued that the bank just used existing rules and 
that he did not want to have to guess what the prime minister wanted them 
to pay in taxes. He said if he had to act otherwise it would be necessary to 
make more precise rules that would specifically prevent the bank from 
using this scheme. A bizarre aspect of this story is that the bank internally 
had been following my ideas about value-based leadership, with the CEO 
arguing internally that they did not need very specific rules in order to act 
responsibly.  
 What we see here might be typical. Businesses believe that they are 
forced to act in a REMM-like fashion due the competition in the market. 
They are not looking to the purpose of the regulation instead they are 
looking to the wording of the laws in their attempt to find loopholes, thus 
following the REMM-like ruthless logic discussed above. “They respond 
creatively to the opportunities the environment presents to them, and they 
work to loosen constraints that prevent them from doing what they wish to 
do”
57 Apparently these wishes do not include the wish to act responsibly 
and in the interest of society. 
This means that public regulation does not necessarily promote a 
responsible attitude in business, it may only force it to look responsible. 
The attitude of REMM-like decision-makers in business might actually 
become less responsible, and I am not sure that an unwieldy state apparatus 
will ever be able to come up with enough rules to compensate for this.  
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The logic of the market overwhelms every nation state, and in most 
cases they submit willingly to it, because this is also the logic that is 
believed to promote growth and better living standards.  
It is also a logic that today aggressively spreads like a contagious dis-
ease into areas that were once beyond the logic. More than thirty years ago 
a David Friedman
58 argued in favour of selling the streets, the prisons and 
if I remember correctly even the courts to the highest bidder. At the time 
such suggestions may have seemed outrageous. Today this is a road many 
governments are following, arguing that the logic of free market and com-
petition will assure efficiency and better service than a public monopoly. 
Sandel sees this as “one of the most powerful social and political tenden-
cies of our time, namely the extension of markets and of market-oriented 
thinking to spheres of life once thought to lie beyond their reach.”
59 One of 
the latest examples may be President Bush’s plan for the privatization of 
social Security in the US. 
 Here the big question is what will happen when the logic of the market 
and REMM-like behaviour spills over into areas until recently decoupled 
from this logic. What happens if we come to see interaction with others in 
terms reminding us of the Do ut des game? Remembering that this logic 
can only contribute to the corroding and breaking down of explicit regula-
tion and implicit moral norms. It cannot contribute to a creation of limits to 
its own expansion. Will that not contribute to a further erosion of the deep 
values that made some individuals in the Do ut des game behave in a way 
that would have benefited all?  
This seems to be a fear shared by Fukuyama in “The Great Disrup-
tion.”
60 He sees many recent social pathologies as resulting from the eco-
nomic trends of the last decades.  
Letting economic theory weaken our motives 
If we believe that people are only acting in their own self-interest and that 
even altruistic behaviour is just a perverse form of this self-interest, per-
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haps shown by a especially cunning REMM man whose real motives we 
have not yet discovered, then this will have consequences in practice. We 
would then assume that in order to make people act in a certain way there 
must be something in it for them, something that entices them, or there 
must some negative individual consequences that force them. To lure peo-
ple to do something we must play on their self-interest, there must be an 
advantage, perhaps in the shape of money. Payment and incentive schemes 
would be designed accordingly. 
In a series of experiments using rats in the fifties Skinner had shown 
that rewards can influence behaviour.
61 Rewarding a given behaviour 
increased the likelihood that the behaviour would be shown again. In rats at 
least. When this behaviour was no longer rewarded, the likelihood of 
showing the previously rewarded behaviour declined to what it had been 
before the behaviour was rewarded. Vice versa, if certain forms of behav-
iour was punished, the probability of this type of behaviour was reduced. 
These results of Skinner’s experiments “led to a widespread advocacy 
of rewards as a motivational strategy.”
62 The experiments with rat-behav-
iour seemed to support the idea that economic man would in his self-inter-
ested way also show a rat-like behaviour and react in the same way to 
rewards. Perhaps the same can  be said about the ideas of the modern 
“Business Performance” movement.
63  
Is that how we are motivated? Or is human-like behaviour different? 
Deci divides motivation into extrinsic and intrinsic. Extrinsic motivation 
to engage in activity would be found where one is expecting an external 
reward of some kind, for example money, for engaging in the activity. That 
would fit the rat-like version as well as the view of economic man in eco-
nomic theory. 
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 One is intrinsically motivated to engage in an activity “When one 
receives no apparent reward except the activity itself.”
64 Intrinsic motiva-
tion means that at least some human activities are carried out because they 
bring their own rewards to the individuals engaged in them. The individu-
als thus engaged are intrinsically motivated. Thus the children might be 
engaged in drawing because they like drawing, even in the absence of any 
rewards. In fact all human beings might be doing things because they find 
them interesting, engaging, intriguing, stimulating, pleasurable, etc. I won-
der if the many words we have for these feelings indirectly point to their 
importance in daily life. The activity in itself might thus be rewarding, not 
some external reward that one has been promised for doing that activity.  
In a small study Lepper, Green and Nisbett
65 put forward the hypothesis 
that a person’s intrinsic interest in an activity can be undermined by extrin-
sic goals that induce the person to engage in the activity. They assert that 
external justification may have as a result that the person loses his intrinsic 
interest in the activity. In other words only doing the activity if there is an 
extrinsic reward.  
 In order to see if Lepper, Green and Nisbett’s hypothesis could be con-
firmed pre-school children making drawings under three different condi-
tions were observed. All the children were observed to enjoy drawing. In 
the experiment the children were to make drawings under three different 
conditions. In one group children agreed to make drawings for a reward (a 
certificate with gold seal and ribbon). Another group were drawing without 
any expectation of a reward, but were given an unexpected reward after-
wards. The third group were just making drawings without neither expect-
ing nor receiving a reward. 
All the children were then observed engaged in drawing 1-2 weeks later 
without any promises of rewards. 
The group of children that had been drawing for a reward in the experi-
ment now showed less interest in the activity of drawing than the other 
children. Lepper, Green and Nisbett also mention that the drawings made 
by that group were of a lower quality, whatever that means. They con-
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cluded that the group of children who had been drawing for a reward in the 
experiment had lost intrinsic motivation for drawing.  
The conclusion would seem to be that the promise of being given an 
extrinsic reward lowered the value of the intrinsic reward of drawing, thus 
making them less interested in drawing, without an expectation of a reward 
at a later time. 
This might just be child’s play compared to the studies undertaken by 
Deci et al, and later in economics by Frey et al. 
In the seventies Deci began a series of studies
66 that revealed that tangi-
ble extrinsic rewards could apparently undermine the intrinsic motivation 
for engaging in an activity. In essence saying that if we are paid to engage 
in the activity of drawing or something else, then the interest in drawing 
motivated by the interest in the activity of drawing in itself (the intrinsic 
reward) would be undermined. Later Lepper and Green
67 talked of the hid-
den cost of reward, referring to the crowding out of intrinsic motivation by 
extrinsic motivation. Such ideas can also be found in the relatively recent 
Cognitive Evaluation Theory, in which the ability to complete a task is 
itself motivation to carry out the task with no further external motivation. 
“Cognitive Evaluation Theory asserts that underlying intrinsic motivation 
are the psychological needs for autonomy and competence.”
68  
According to these studies and ideas an increase in say the monetary 
incentives for carrying out a certain activity might diminish the intrinsic 
motivation for carrying out that activity. In fact the result may be that over-
all motivation decreases with a resulting drop in productivity, quality or 
whatever we are using to measure the output from the activity.
69 
Now such an idea goes directly against the postulates of economic the-
ory, according to which monetary incentives would of course contribute to 
an increase in motivation, resulting in a higher effort and presumably also a 
higher output from the activity. Thus the crowding out of intrinsic motiva-
tion is what Frey calls an anomaly in economics, it cannot be explained by 
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the theory. It does not belong to the realm of economic theory, it is not 
comprehensible. 
 Psychology may help us explain what is inexplicable in economics. 
Especially the theories about self-determination, which I call the I control 
aspect and theories about self-esteem, which I call I value aspect. 
In the I control instance a reduction in individual self-determination due 
to outside intervention, in the shape of monetary rewards or attempts to 
force the individual to carry out certain activities, diminishes the one’s 
control over the activity and the importance of doing it for it’s own sake. 
 In the I value instance Frey notes: “When an intervention from the out-
side carries the notion that the actor’s motivation is not acknowledged, his 
or her intrinsic motivation is effectively rejected.”
70 When one’s values and 
motivation are made worthless in this way one may reduce the effort put 
into the activity. 
A more thorough discussion of the relation between monetary incentives 
and motivation may be found in Katz.
71  
Such effects may help us understand under which conditions intrinsic or 
self-motivation may be crowded-out or crowded-in in Frey’s terminology. 
 
(1) External interventions crowd-out intrinsic motivation if the 
individuals perceive them to be controlling. In that case both self-
determination and self-esteem suffer ….”  
(2) External interventions crowd–in intrinsic motivation if the 
individuals concerned perceive it as supportive. In that case, self-
esteem is fostered, and individuals feel that they are given more 
freedom to act, thus enlarging self-determination
72 
 
Whether we contribute to crowding-out, crowding-neutral, or crowding-
in effects is important in many areas of society. Just think of recent incen-
tives or performance pay schemes for managers as well employees. 
Schemes for rewarding children from kindergartens to schools. Schemes 
for involving employees more like, empowerment or self-organisation. Or 
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think of social policies and unemployment policies in which monetary 
incentives, or the opposite monetary deductions in benefits, are used in the 
attempt to influence the behaviour of individuals. 
Letting economic theory distort our endeavours 
I wonder if such schemes could also have another effect on individual 
motivation and behaviour apart from the crowding out effects discussed 
here. Think for instance of a public institution that has been created to fulfil 
a certain purpose. Inspired by schemes found in the private sector new 
incentive schemes are introduced using for instance performance based 
pay.  
Now this would mean that we have to provide clear definitions of per-
formance, and posses the ability to carry out accurate measurements, as 
well making sure that there is a tight connection between the favourable 
outcomes and the resulting reward. Like other extrinsic goals these defini-
tions and measures may influence the behaviour of managers and employ-
ees in the institution. Making them focus on the goals set and the measures 
used, whatever their relation to the overall purpose of the institution. Man-
agers and employees may realise that the goals set and the measures used 
do not reflect the overall goals, but what can they do about that individu-
ally. Presumably they will leave their own knowledge and qualms aside 
and strive for the extrinsic rewards. The performance pay schemes or what-
ever. 
The chief of the Danish police [Rigspolitichefen] gets a part of his sal-
ary by fulfilling a very specific so-called payment-by-results-contract 
[Resultatlønskontrakt] running for a year at a time.
73 One of the more 
recent contracts contained a long to do list with different weights for differ-
ent sections of the contract. Here is a selection of elements from the 2003 
contract. Under the section, “Implementation of an activity based manage-
ment information system” (weight 20%), he is to establish possibilities for 
the use of the balanced scorecard management tool. “Digitalisation of pro-
curement processes” (weight 10%) implies a test of the new public digital 
procurement system, for instance for buying wiping off paper [aftørring-
spapir]. Exactly what this paper is used for is not specified. “Implementa-
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tion of the general personnel policies” (weight 10%) means that he has to 
have existing personnel policies evaluated and has to support knowledge 
sharing amongst police districts.  
Nowhere could one see a goal relating directly to the stated purpose of 
the Danish Police: “The police shall work for safety, security, peace and 
order in society. The police shall promote this purpose through preventive, 
helping and enforcing activity.”
74 What we see instead are mostly goals 
that seem either to be part of normal chief of police’s job or simply arbi-
trary and difficult to explain goals and activities, that perhaps say more 
about The Department of Justice’s current whims and fads. 
In another example taken from the a regional employment agency some 
of the goals of their contract for a given year are stated like this: Number of 
CV-talks: 6,500, Screening talks: 5,400, Individual job plans: 7,500. After 
half a year they have carried out 3,525 CV- talks, 3,900 Screening talks, 
and made 3,171 job plans.
75  
Even though the outlook is rosy, some of these goals were reduced in 
the “Half-year Status Report for 2004.”
76 With these reductions the agency 
may achieve the reduced goals for that year, and this also goes for the rest 
of the goals specified. The only thing is, none of the goals measure whether 
more people become employed as a result of the efforts or whether the un–
employed are getting better qualified for potential jobs. The measures are 
only indirectly related to the overall goals of the employment agency. They 
mirror internal activity goals that they strive really hard to reach, according 
to the report for the first half of 2004.  
It is as if the efforts of the whole agency have become misdirected 
towards fulfilling some quantifiable goals that may have only a loose con-
nection to the real purpose of getting people employed or helping them to 
become more employable through enhancing their qualifications. Thus the 
goal setting and measurement schemes seem peripheral and strangely 
unrelated to the overall purpose of having an employment agency. We con-
clude that such goals and measures will pervert the overall activities of the 
organisation subject to them. The fulfilment of the more or less arbitrary 
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goals becomes the goals of the organisation, even though individual 
endeavours may still be directed towards the overall purpose. 
Further examples are provided by the Danish Tax and Customs author-
ity [ToldSkat]. One example being a goal set up for the 8 regional customs 
centres. In 1999 they were given the goal of carrying out 10.000 physical 
inspections, and together they reached the amazing number of 31,300. In 
one of the centres they had achieved a goal attainment of 1,482%.
77  
Now, does that mean that they are very good at their work or what? 
Actually we do not know, as we do not know what has happened to the 
areas not being subject to the same kind of goal setting and measurements. 
What we suspect is of course that much of the organisation’s energy has 
been focused on reaching high values on the goals being measured, ignor-
ing the aspects that are not measured. 
This is in fact a phenomenon that reminds me of the so-called command 
economies found for instance in the former Soviet Union. Where quantifi-
able goals in the absence of a price- and market mechanism were used to 
set output targets for all sorts of activities. In the end this proved to be a 
very inefficient system. I wonder if the same is going to happen here in our 
societies now that we are trying to implement en miniature methods from a 
command economy here and there and everywhere, from schools, through 
hospitals to universities, and of course in business. 
If we know nothing or only very little about the causal relations between 
the aspects we can measure and the purpose we want to promote, we may 
in fact find that setting such goals and carrying out such measurements 
results in a counterproductive and distorted behaviour, in as much as they 
have a negative influence on those subjected to this kind of evaluation. In 
the end we suspect that our ideas of what something means and what 
qualities are important will change as a result of the inherent demands of 
the quantifiable goals and measurements. The activity of individuals and 
organisations will of necessity become oriented toward the aspects being 
measured and evaluated, whether they are seen as reasonable or not. This is 
conclusion supported by the work done by Osterloh and Frey
78. 
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An example concerns executive compensation. Perhaps the term com-
pensation already conveys the idea that this about an economic relation-
ship, that has nothing to with power, influence, ability to realise ideas etc. 
What is of interest here though are theories indicating the motivational 
benefits of individual competitiveness among employees as a result of 
using individual compensation schemes. Basing those compensation 
schemes on the achievements of the company over a certain limited time 
period, and as measured by growth in turnover, profits and/or share prices, 
is assumed to motivate management to greater efforts.  
A study by Ensley and Grider showed that new venture growth was in 
fact positively related to entrepreneurial team pay dispersion. Thus the 
assumptions seem to be confirmed. Now is this because managers act like 
REMM men or is it because it is the measure that is used to demonstrate 
success? If this is the measure of success, who am I to question it? Mean-
ing that self-fulfilling theories might influence practice in this example.  
This might also be the case with pay dispersion schemes, as they seem 
to be called euphemistically, for more ordinary employees. Studies corre-
lating pay incentives and the results achieved may show that incentives and 
results are correlated. What may happen along the way is that employees 
become so influenced by the schemes that they act like REMM men, 
demanding compensation for every extra effort, thus creating what may be 
called a pay culture. If that happens, whatever else might influence moti-
vation and efforts, may decline in importance, being as it were no longer 
appreciated. Thereby making pay incentive and pay dispersion schemes a 
self-fulfilling success. 
Is that something we should be concerned about? Well, let us have a 
look on some of the ramifications of just the pay schemes. O’Reilly et al
79 
conclude: “These theories have largely ignored considerations of fairness 
and loyalty. In contrast to these assumptions, the results reported here are 
consistent with the psychological benefits of equity and compressed wage 
structures, and show how wage dispersion and inequity may impose costs 
on senior teams and shareholders.” 
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Ensley and Grider
80 seem to reach similar conclusion showing that pay 
dispersion was inversely related to agreement in entrepreneurial teams. It 
affected the teams behaviour by increasing disagreement, creating anger 
and tension. Thus in a way individualising team members, perhaps turning 
them instead into competing REMM men.  
 Other studies certainly seem to confirm this. In their recent book “Pay 
without performance”
81 Bebchuk and Fried, argue that a number of factors 
in fact prevent executive performance pay schemes from having any rela-
tion to performance. A lack of arm’s length separation between a board and 
an executive seeking better schemes for raising his pay may mean that pay 
is more a result of powerful executive influence with a board that accepts 
schemes not related to performance, or perhaps even hidden forms of com-
pensation, the cost of which is camouflaged. 
Frey and Osterloh
82 argue that performance pay schemes for managers 
provide mangers with incentives for creative manipulation of the criteria 
used to measure performance. They even suggest that  such schemes could 
lead to fraudulent accounting in order to fulfil the criteria. Their conclu-
sion: managers should be paid like bureaucrats. The problem with their 
suggestion is that today governments everywhere seek to introduce similar 
schemes for top bureaucrats, probably with the same problematic results, 
manipulation of criteria and perhaps even fraud.   
Holmström and Milgrom
83 as well as Hall and Knox
84(2005) see similar 
problems with executive option plans that create non-linear incentives that 
can be manipulated, presumably by unscrupulous REMM men, or schemes 
that encourage excessive risk-taking which may have been the case with 
Enron’s executives. I wonder what is going to happen to hedge- and equity 
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funds where the sums involved are truly enormous. Manager’s with a 
strong REMM like behaviour may feel tempted to make performance fig-
ures look better than they are, especially since managers in a typical fund 
get an annual fee of around 1.5 % of the fund’s assets.
85  
In option schemes “The vesting periods are often short causing man-
agement to focus on the short run rather than long-run stock price.”
86 
Something that was discouraged by the earliest incentive schemes, where a 
long horizon was recommended.
87 “As executive terms get shorter and 
executive pay packets get bigger, it is hardly surprising that some try to 
make their spell at the top as profitable as possible,. In extreme cases this 
can go as far as aggressive earnings management.”
88  
 Furthermore it would seem that these schemes are asymmetrical in as 
much as a lacklustre performance does result in any deductions from the 
executives’ pay, the result would only be that options would not be used. 
Problems tightly connected to these schemes may be found in the prin-
ciples relating to the concept of shareholder value, the management princi-
ple of maximizing the worth of a corporation to shareholders, as repre-
sented for instance by Rappaport’s
89 now classical “Creating Shareholder 
Value.”  
Without getting deeper in the theory we want to question the concept as 
reflected in the focus on quarterly statements. How will managers subject 
to these principles and called to account every three month ever be able to 
emphasize the long term development of the company. "Since the stock 
market tends to respond positively to any announcement of an impending 
cut, why worry? Just keep on cutting. Shareholder value has become, for 
all intents and purposes, managing exclusively for the short term."
90 In this 
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way managers were either forced to behave like REMM men as the theory 
predicted, or disappear from the brightly lit scene of the winners.  
The manager is forced to take a short term view in order to satisfy his 
shareholders. Shareholders are more or less regarded as the owners, in 
whose interest the manager must act. Formally this may be so, but it may 
convey a wrong impression.  Unlike family-owned businesses, where the 
owner presumably has a long term interest in the company, the shareholder 
may have absolute no interest in the company, in which he has shares. In 
fact modern day shareholders act like super REMM men with absolutely no 
loyalty to the company. They are willing to move their interest to another 
company with brighter short term prospects without a moment’s hesitation, 
whenever this is recommended by financial analysts. In other words the 
shareholder’s interest is in a high return, certainly not in a certain company. 
Led by analysts their interest is in short term quarterly statements. 
Thus it seems strange to advocate that the manager’s highest priority is 
in satisfying such potential disloyal and often short-sighted stakeholders. In 
a strange way the focus on shareholders and on short-term prospects have 
led to a decoupling from the long-term well-being of the company and thus 
the long term value of the shares. 
 I wonder if this decoupling, this capitalism without owners, will not get 
worse with the growth of hedge funds and equity funds. Whether these will 
not become in the words of the former chairman of the German Social 
Democratic Party, Müntefering, locusts, moving from to company to com-
pany ribbing it of capital and leaving it with no possibility of long-term 
success
91. Somewhat like the infamous Chainsaw Al or Al Dunlap who 
became known for apparent ability to turn around troubled companies to 
the delight of shareholders. Alas, the turn around was due more to short-
term window-dressing, than long-term prospects. 
Still: “The pressure not to “miss a quarter”–not to upset the expectations 
of the market analysts–can promote some awful dysfunctional behavior. 
Executives are forced to watch the scoreboard instead of the ball, as the 
saying goes, to cut costs where the savings show up immediately (in jobs 
eliminated, for example), even if long-term benefits are foregone; to 
squeeze extra sales out of premature deliveries; at worst to cut ethical cor-
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ners and sometimes engage in downright illegal actions. All of this for 
more “value.”” 
92  
REMM men would have no scruples. In the competition to show the 
best shareholder value, they might overstep explicit rules and implicit 
norms. I believe that ENRON and WorldCom may be examples of this 
attitude. “Firms like Enron and WorldCom were aggressively pursuing 
exotic forms financial engineering with the help of their accountants and 
the forbearance of financial analysts. They, of course, veered from legality 
into illegality as they tried to convince investors that their futures were 
bright.”
93  
They were not the only companies to collapse. In 2001 the stock market 
bubble burst and it was revealed that financial analysts, CFOs, boards of 
directors, and auditors had frequently engaged in distorting firms' financial 
performances in order to boost stock prices. “The people who pushed the 
financial envelope here did so precisely because they had exhausted the 
easiest ways to make their balance sheets look better. In pursuit of higher 
gains, they turned to ploys that were illegal.”  
To curb this kind of behaviour in the future at least in the US the true 
and proven remedy of closing door after the horse has bolted was used in 
the shape of the so-called Oxley-Sarbanes Act. The new act makes corpo-
rate chief executives personally responsible for the accuracy of their com-
panies’ financial statements. Elsewhere there has been a spate of business 
initiated corporate governance initiatives, that presumably are designed to 
remind and encourage managers and boards to behave responsibly. In “The 
end of shareholder value” Kennedy argues for that corporate purpose , 
objectives and values must be broadened to include stakeholder groups.
94 
The REMM answer to these measures? “the constraint or law will 
almost always generate behavior which was never imagined by its spon-
sors. Why? Because of the sponsors’ failure to recognize the creativity of 
REMMs”
95 With no change in their attitudes and values they would look 
for ways to circumvent the laws and regulations. According to this view it 
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will prove costly in regulative measures to force REMM men to behave in 
responsible and other-regarding manner.  
“… the structural features of the investment-banking industry that cre-
ated powerful incentives for misbehavior have been disturbed very little, 
creating perhaps the worst of all possible worlds–a costly regulatory 
regime, higher costs of doing business (higher pay for directors, more con-
sultants, more meetings) and increased risk-aversion by corporate 
boards…”
96  
The only alternative would be to look for and promote some kind of 
individual responsibility and self-regulation, or a kind of moral economy, 
because as Marshall et al asserted in their classic “The Economics of 
Industry,” “uprightness and mutual confidence are necessary conditions for 
the growth of wealth.”
 97  
Letting economic theory distort our obligations 
When someone is asked why he was speeding, a common reply might be: 
"Well, I had to get to my meeting on time, and I judged the risk of being 
caught to be slight, and even if there had been a radar trap it would only 
have cost me 500 kroner or so...". 
In this instance it seems that a rule concerning speed limits is violated 
because the risk of being caught breaking it is slight and the fine one would 
have to pay, if caught, considered insignificant. In this way the balance 
between one's own utility and the rule against speeding tipped in favour of 
one's self-interest. 
In another situation a manager of a recycling firm might one day be told 
that the firm has a problem, because a container has developed a leak, and 
that 1000 litres of a dangerous liquid have been spilled. He has to decide 
what should be done. According to environmental regulation such spills 
should be contained, sucked up, and transported to a treatment plant. On 
the other hand it would be a lot cheaper just to hose it out through the 
drainpipes. 
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In this case the manager decides that the spill should be contained and 
sent to the treatment plant. When asked why he decided to react in this 
way, he replies: "If we had decided just to hose it down the drain pipes the 
chances of being caught would have been high, as a lot of people would 
have known about it, and they would talk, ... and I know that the fines 
would have been very heavy, and so...". 
His response matches the former response to the speeding question. It is 
based on the same simple rational calculation using the subjective calcu-
lated risk of being caught, "multiplied" by the heaviness of the fines and 
compared with what could be saved or gained by violating the rules. 
This indicates that we really are calculating REMM bastards, which 
have to be paid or forced to behave responsibly. 
This is also a basic assumption in agency theory, the roots of which go 
back to the classic “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”
98. 
When there is separation of owner ship and control, “the interests of the 
latter are as likely as not to be at variance with those of ownership”
99 
Meaning of course that the latter may serve his own interests instead of 
those of the owner.  
In the parlance of modern agency theory. The agent  or manager has a 
self-interest that differs from that of the principal’s or owner’s self-interest. 
Thus the problem of agency theory is to make sure that the agent acts in the 
best interest of the principal. The principal compensates the agent for per-
forming certain functions that are in the interest of the principal, such as 
making a profit. The problem arises because it is difficult and costly to 
observe the agent carrying out the function, and his performance in that 
function. Thus there is a need for measures that will align the interests of 
the principal and the agent. This brings us to the transaction cost theories. 
Ghosphal and Moran
100 argue that the theories and the views of man and 
his behavioural motives inherent in the transaction costs economics of for 
instance Williamson, may actually lead one in practice to erect barriers to 
the behaviour postulated by the theory. Behaviour that would seem 
strangely similar to the behaviour of REMM men. To guard against this 
supposed behaviour the hierarchies and structures found in traditional 
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organisations would be created. Detailed and all encompassing written 
rules of conduct would be made and systems for monitoring adherence to 
these rules would be erected and so forth and so on. Thus in practice cre-
ating and enforcing a system of distrust and control.  
Let us assume that the view of man found in the REMM model is incor-
rect. That with real men, and women of course, we would find trust, 
morality, certain norms of behaviour, loyalty, responsibility for carrying 
out task that one had taken upon oneself, and perhaps even a genuine inter-
est in work, and a sense of quality. As I see it there might perhaps also be a 
kind of motivation related to an internal feeling of obligation to do the right 
thing. 
What would happen if these real men and women were placed in a sys-
tem characterised by mistrust, close surveillance, rules, and sanctions? Is it 
not possible that hierarchical controlling systems might actually diminish 
the importance of the qualities possessed by these man? Seeing that these 
qualities are not appreciated, men with a less strong adherence to these 
norms may actually begin to act like cunning REMM men, gaining indi-
vidual advantages in shape of perhaps less effort for the same salary, and 
reacting to extrinsic incentives. Acting in fact like an S-player in the Do ut 
des game. What happens may be a result of differential advantages, those 
who are more prone to act like REMM men will automatically have an 
advantage allowing them to move forward, gaining more influence and 
more power to make decisions. While those sticking to a less REMM-like 
conviction may lose out in the competition.  
This is not the only possible effect, if the intrinsic ability to show a kind 
of responsible autonomy and competence is undermined by control and 
external incentives, work effort might suffer. 
Research into the actual behaviour of managers and employees in such a 
system may then indicate that the view of man found in transaction cost 
theory was correct. Thus the postulates of transactions cost theory would 
actually have become true. 
Ferraro et al assets that “the assumptions in transactions costs econom-
ics about how people behave become widely accepted as valid descriptions 
of behavior. These beliefs then become transformed into norms, those 44 
“overarching shalts and shalt nots” that govern so much human behavior 
and are reflected in management practices consistent with those norms.”
101  
Support for our assumptions comes from a study entitled “Do job 
executives work harder when they are monitored?”
102  This is a study of the 
influence of regulation and supervision on the work effort. Data from 116 
managers in medium sized Dutch firms is used. Effort is measured as the 
number of hours put into work. A measure of the regulation they are sub-
jected to is formed from regularity with which their performance is evalu-
ated, the formality of the evaluation and the strictness of the criteria used. 
 The results of study showed that impersonal control was positively 
related to work effort, while personalised control was negatively related to 
work effort. The net effect was negative, indicating that control crowds out 
intrinsic motivation in relation to work effort.  
Frey refers to a study in which the effects of financial rewards on the 
efforts of volunteers were analysed. “While the size of the rewards induces 
individuals to provide more volunteer work, the mere fact that they receive 
a payment significantly reduces their work efforts by approximately four 
hours. The magnitude of these effects is considerable.”
103  
We might easily get the idea that the vaguer notions are pushed aside. 
We no longer look to the spirit of the rule, we look to the letter of the rule. 
That would at least explain the necessity of having interpretations that will 
help pinpoint the right behaviour and the precise institutional responsibili-
ties. A manager or an employee will only have to act according to the letter 
of the guidelines. If this is what is happening, the attempt to create institu-
tional responsibility will in fact reduce individual responsibility, and this 
will lead to a demand for more specific guidelines, and interpretations. One 
might get the strong suspicion that the more regulations and guidelines we 
create the less responsible behaviour we will see. 
An employee may have a very specific responsibility towards a certain 
job and certain people, colleagues or managers, owners and customers, in a 
specific company. A social worker may have very specific responsibilities 
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as part of the job, towards specific clients. “The tax official’s responsibility 
for collecting taxes is not predicated on the merits of this or any taxation 
system but on his undertaking the office.”
104 In all cases very specific 
responsibilities are held by very specific individuals toward identifiable 
other people. We might therefore speak of a specific institutional responsi-
bility, with members holding the specific, individual responsibility, only in 
so far as they represent the institution.  
In contrast to a more universal and vague responsibility, these individu-
als do not all share the same potential responsibility. They can in fact say: 
This is not my table, or client, or patient. This kind of responsibility 
relieves the individual of an unspecified amount of responsibility; only a 
specified part belongs to them as long as they are in exactly that role, and 
only from 9 to 5. 
I wonder if this will also be a problem with the attempts to implement 
so-called corporate social responsibility standards, like those found in the 
Austrian “Corporate Social Responsibility – Guidance for the Implementa-
tion of Corporate Social Responsibility”
105) and in the ISO’s upcoming 
attempt to develop an International Standard containing guidelines for 
social responsibility. ISO expects that developing the standard will take 
three years, with publication in early 2008.  
I assert that the more we attempt to anchor responsibilities in specific 
laws, written rules and statements, and in special institutions, the more we 
lose individual commitment to all the vaguer notions of responsibility and 
trust.  
This assertion would seem to be supported by the conclusions reached 
in a paper called “More Order with Less Law.”
106 The paper looks at con-
tract enforcement in a game experiment in order to analyse the theoretical 
assumption that more law increases the likelihood of keeping a contract. 
More law meaning a higher probability of enforcement and a higher cost of 
breaching the contract. 
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In the game a first mover has to decide whether to enter into a contract 
without knowing whether contract partner (the second mover ) will honour 
or breach the contract. Breaching the contract carries the risk of incurring a 
cost. “Standard economic analysis of law predicts that the higher the 
expected cost of breach is, the more likely second movers are to per-
form.”
107  In this view the second mover will behave like a REMM man, 
only honouring the contract if the expected cost of breaching it becomes 
too high. 
 The results of the game experiment carried out by Bohnet contradict 
this simple economic man view. “With high levels of contract enforceabil-
ity, all second movers perform because they are deterred regardless of their 
preferences, and all first movers enter the contract; preferences are irrele-
vant and outcomes are efficient. With intermediate levels, honesty is 
crowded out; more second movers breach and resources are wasted in tri-
als. With low levels, trustworthiness is crowded in; more second movers 
perform even though they would have an incentive to breach without a 
preference for honesty and efficiency increases.”
108 
The explanation for this unexpected result is as follows.  If the contract 
partners are in environment with a high levels of law and a high level of 
contract enforceability, the second mover can be expected to keep the con-
tract, due the high expected cost of breaching the contract. Thus the first 
mover will enter the contract. This means that in a “high levels of law” 
environment we may expect second mover to perform. Just like the eco-
nomic theory would have predicted. A view reminding one of the harsh 
view of Hobbes in which men have to be restrained in natural passions by a 
“visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment 
to the performance of their Covenants.”
109  
The surprising observation that contracts are also honoured by the sec-
ond movers in the situation with low levels of law and enforceability 
demands an explanation outside the realm of economic man. In a situation 
where people know each other one would expect that they have built up a 
level of knowledge and trust that would induce first movers to enter into a 
contract with the expectation that the second mover would honour the con-
tract even in the absence of law and high costs for breaching the contract. 
                                          
107 Ibid. p. 2. 
108 Ibid. p. 4. 
109 Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan (1982 ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 223. 47 
This might be intuitively understandable given that first and second mover 
know and trust each other. 
In larger anonymous societies this would not be the case. Here the 
explanation may run as follows. The first mover might act carefully only 
entering into contract with individuals deemed trustworthy.  That could 
mean something as simple as trusting individuals that would blush if they 
told a lie. In such situation “ there can be a great advantage in knowing to 
be a blusher.”
110  
Caution might reduce the risk of entering a contract with a second 
mover who would breach it. Trustworthy second movers would get a repu-
tation for being trustworthy and thus probably be offered more contracts 
than second movers being deemed untrustworthy. “If people are free to 
interact with others of their own choosing, and if there are cues that distin-
guish co-operators from defectors, then co-operators will interact selec-
tively with one another and earn higher payoffs than defectors.”
111  
Hence Bohnet et al concludes: “honesty will be crowded in.” 
Less law might thus mean that trustworthiness becomes important, 
meaning in fact that less law might further individual trustworthiness 
amongst individuals. A truly important effect. Reputation building and trust 
could be just as efficient as high levels of law in creating an environment 
where first movers enter into contracts and second movers honour the con-
tracts. 
This is a result similar to the ones reached by Axelrod
112 in his applica-
tion of game theory. In some of Axelrod’s game simulations, cooperation 
results from the interplay of very simple and single minded individual 
players consisting of nothing more than small programs representing dif-
ferent behaviours, running through a number of iterations or repeated 
games. Axelrod builds a whole theory of cooperation on these simulations, 
although it would seem that the end results are very sensitive to the initial 
parameters of the players and the game.  
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“Contractual relationships with weak enforcement are typical for many 
organizational settings. Some firms purposely create a low enforcement 
environment where interactions are not guided by the expected cost of 
breach but by intrinsic motivation.”
113 A result that fits well with our theory 
of value-based leadership and self-organisation. “It is from the dynamism 
of self-organising initiatives and movements like these that we may learn 
what drivers are important for self-organisation to succeed. Drivers that 
would represent the real alternative to the petty efforts that turn us into 
egotistical competing individuals. Drivers that would have a much bigger 
potential for calling forth extraordinary efforts and enhanced creativity.”
114  
Now to the third situation. The intermediate situation, in which there is 
more laws than in the trust situation, but less than in the high levels of law 
situation.  
With intermediate levels of law and thus lower expected cost of 
breaching the contract, “the expected payoff of entering is higher than the 
payoff of abstaining even if you know that the contract will be breached. 
Accordingly, you will enter regardless of your beliefs about your partner’s 
trustworthiness. This unconditional trust makes expected monetary payoff–
maximizing second movers more successful than honest types who forsake 
profitable opportunities to breach.”
115  
This would mean that an intermediate level of law would lead to the 
crowding out of trustworthiness. In such an environment the second mov-
ers who breach the contracts would gain an advantage with a low probabil-
ity of incurring a high cost. Under the gaming conditions first movers 
would still enter into contracts because the probability is such that the pay-
off from entering is bigger than the payoff of not entering into a contract, 
even though the contract may not be honoured by the second mover.  
The results from the game experiment lead Bohnet et al to the conclu-
sion that there are in fact two alternatives. One characterised by “more 
order with more law” and one characterised by “more order with less 
law.”
116 
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I do not think that she is right. In the less law situation trustworthiness is 
preserved, because people would want to have a reputation for being trust-
worthy.  
In the high levels of law situation we would never really be able to cre-
ate a situation in which contracts were complete and the level of their 
enforcement reached 100%. Remembering that the only thing that made 
second movers honour their contracts was the potential high cost of 
breaching them, we would in reality expect that second movers would look 
for loopholes in contracts and areas with less enforcement with the inten-
tion of breaching the contracts. 
That contracts are in fact honoured can be seen as a result of the degree 
of supervision, control and the subjectively judged heaviness of the sanc-
tions imposed on those being caught breaching the contract. With this kind 
of attitude contracts would only be honoured if there is a certain amount of 
supervision and control, and the sanctions for breaching are harsh enough. 
This means that some kind of power apparatus must exist, taking care of 
supervision, control and the metering out of sanctions.  
 In the trust situation we would want to be worthy of trust, while in the 
high levels of law situation we would in fact act like REMMs. Only the 
risk of being caught transgressing the law and the severity of the sanction 
would force us to behave in a way that would make us keep our promises.  
Thus the two situations are very different. In fact I would tend to see the 
high levels of law situation as the end-variant of the intermediate version. 
In the intermediate situation we would expect that there would be a clam-
our for more law, with the result that the last remnants of trustworthiness 
would be crowded out. Personal trust and obligation would dwindle, being 
substituted by a kind of wary forced-upon-us trust in an institutional sys-
tem.  
This is not the same trust as the trust in others. Trust in another person 
includes the trust that he will not take advantage of me, even if the contract 
is not complete. Trust in an institutional system does not include that kind 
of trust, it is so to speak only the trust that the letter of the law will pre-
sumably be abided by. So I have to know the law and I have to make sure 
that I have covered all the bases.  
Presumably it would be too costly to create a system of controls and 
sanctions that would somehow make the potential costs of every form of 
transgressions high enough to prevent breaches of contracts in any form. 50 
Thus even in this situation we would expect that trust in the law as such 
and a felt obligation to abide by the law would be necessary.  
 Just take the case of taxes. It would seem that paying one’s taxes is not 
only something one does because of the possible harsh consequences in 
form of sanctions for tax evasions. In fact the most important for motive for 
paying one’s taxes may be that one sees it as an obligation that has to be 
honoured. “the high compliance rate can only be explained either by tax-
payers' (...) commitment to the responsibilities of citizenship and respect 
for the law or lack of opportunity for tax evasion.”
117  
In contrast to the assumptions found in economic man and in REMM 
men the view of man in democracies, as found for instance in constitutions 
is not one of blatant self-interest. Indeed it is of a man capable of entering 
obligations, imbued with an ability to deliberate about society, and a wish 
to contribute to upholding and developing society.  
REMM-like men in a vicious spiral 
“When people act on the basis of ideology, they inadvertently arrange the 
very conditions that bring reality into correspondence with the ideology.”
118  
A narrow theoretical and methodological focus in scientific studies may 
fail to show that it is actually the actions based upon problematic assump-
tions that lead to these assumptions apparently being true.  In this way 
“theories can “win” in the marketplace for ideas independently of their 
empirical validity to the extent that their assumptions and language become 
taken for granted, normatively valued, and therefore, create conditions that 
make the theories come “true.””
119 
MacKenzie and Millo provide us with an example of how this may hap-
pen. It concerns the famous Black-Scholes formula which expresses the 
price of an option as a function of certain parameters and the volatility of 
the price of the underlying asset. The formula could apparently make accu-
rate predictions with deviations down to around 2% in the late seventies. 
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“This empirical success was not due to the model describing a preex-
isting reality: as noted, the initial fit between reality and model was fairly 
poor. Instead, two interrelated processes took place. First, the markets 
gradually altered so that many of the model’s assumptions, wildly unreal-
istic when published in 1973, became more accurate […] To the increasing 
veracity of the Black-Scholes-Merton model’s assumptions was added the 
second process: the model’s growing use as a guide to trading.”
120 
Perhaps many of the assertions modern economics have  are in the proc-
ess of becoming what Merton once called self-fulfilling prophecies. A self-
fulfilling prophecy in which “ a false definition of a situation [is] evoking a 
behavior which makes the originally false conception come true.”
121 
The discussion in the previous sections may indicate that this is exactly 
what is happening. That our views of man, the basic assumptions of eco-
nomics, are influencing the way that man behaves. 
 If we are seen as REMM men and treated like REMM men we might 
begin to act like REMM men. Perhaps the management practice of Jack 
Welch in General Electric may show how this works in practice. General 
Electric have become famous, or infamous for promoting a system of inter-
nal competition, in which employees were divided into a three category 
ranking with the top 20% being the stars, and the bottom 10% were weeded 
out. If this scheme does not force employees to act competitively, whatever 
their individual views and inclinations may be, nothing will. What we do 
not see is that this may have repercussions on our willingness to cooperate 
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freely, which may have negative consequences in the long run and in areas 
outside the gates of General Electric. 
We have seen how incentives shaped by such ideas are leading us to 
focus heavily on extrinsic rewards and sanctions to bring forth the desired 
behaviour. What we may not have realised is that these external efforts to 
motivate us to certain activities may in fact quietly erode the motivation 
that we would otherwise have got from the activity itself.  
 I fear that we are in fact in the act of creating a vicious downward 
pointing spiral, in which our views of man more or less force man to act in 
a way that supports this belief. Studies of behaviour in praxis may thus 
show that the assumptions were correct, leading presumably to a strength-
ening of the already problematic influence of these assumptions on prac-
tice. For instance by relying even more on extrinsic motivation, perform-
ance based pay schemes, rules and regulations.  
More reliance on incentive pay schemes may weaken other motives for 
working and for doing a good job even further, creating a need for ever 
more sophisticated schemes with perhaps bigger pay differentials. Perhaps 
that is what we are seeing at the moment where for instance the potential 
earnings by managing directors seem to reach monstrous proportions using 
stock options, that are supposed to motivate them to maximise shareholder 
values. According to Stelzer
122 CEO pay in the new millennium now proba-
bly exceeds average manufacturing wage 400 times. Here one may cer-
tainly talk about pay dispersion, and its advocates would probably argue 
that such differentials are important in making the economy grow. 
As we have seen such schemes may instead distort the behaviour of 
those lured by the incentives to act in way that may be counterproductive in 
the long run, and often inducing people to act in way that is unrelated to the 
overall purpose of the institution or organisation for which they are work-
ing. 
In general we would expect that the perverting influence of such 
schemes is not due to a faulty technique and bad measurements, but is 
inherent in the schemes. The expansion of these schemes that can be 
observed today will presumably pervert the efforts and orientation of these 
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subject to such schemes even further, and further the carriers of those who 
have no qualms with them
123. 
Thus schemes like these would contribute to the vicious downward spi-
ral, in which problematic theories and views of what motivates man 
become ever more self-fulfilling.  
From the discussion of agency theory, transaction cost and the general 
attempt to anchor as it were obligations in rules and regulations, control 
and sanctions we have learned that this may crowd out trust and a personal 
felt-compelled-to obligation to act in a way that would have rendered many 
of these measures superfluous in the first place. What we may experience 
instead is that due to measures that reduce the need for me to act responsi-
bly and devalue the self esteem found in the I value attitudes, there will be 
a need for more and more rules and regulations and for measures that force 
us to observe these rules and regulations. 
“ … a constitution that implies a fundamental distrust of its citizens and 
seeks to discipline them tends to crowd out civic virtue and undermines the 
support which citizens are prepared to exert towards the basic law.”
124  
Distrust of our fellow man whether in shape of agency theory or in 
larger societal perspective, would seem to lead to a cycle of regulation and 
control, which in turn reduces individual responsibilities and observance of 
obligations, leading to the demands for more regulation and control, further 
diminishing the value of self-control and self-esteem, and so forth and so 
on. 
While the ensuing efforts to regulate, control and meter out sanctions 
may seem successful in reducing the occurrence of certain behaviour, like 
breaching contracts, it does not contribute to greater self-regulation. Instead 
regulation promotes an attitude in which rules are only to be obeyed if 
there is a certain amount of supervision and control, and/or the sanctions 
for breaching are harsh enough. 
If supervision, control and sanctions were the only way to make sure 
that rules were followed, the cost of enforcing these rules could easily 
                                          
123 An example might be found in the Danish payment-by-results-contract 
[Resultatlønskontrakt] for University Chancellors critisized in a series of Forskerforum articles 
in the summer of 2005. See for instance Øllgaard, J. (2005). Resultat-adfærd. 
Forskerforum(184, maj 2005), 17. 
124 Frey, B. S. (2002). A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues. Canberra, Australia: 
Working Paper no 31, Centre for Tax System Integrity, Australian National University, p. 8. 54 
become prohibitive, and as a result supervision and control would become 
insufficient. The risk of being caught violating a rule would diminish and 
rule breaking might become the order of the day. 
The result would be a further forceful downward push along the vicious 
downward spiral. 
If I am right we may inadvertently arrange the very conditions that force 
reality into closer and closer correspondence with the ideology, in as much 
another reality is crowded out. 
What will empirical studies of these phenomena show? Due to the 
crowding out effects they may in fact show evidence that gives further con-
firmation to the assumptions that lead to the crowding out in the first place.  
The narrowness and the theoretical and methodological blinders will 
make us fail to discover the negative consequences on the more general 
behaviour, thus leading us to underestimate the negative consequences of 
letting practice be guided by wrong theoretical assumptions. 
The irony is thus that the narrow focus of the studies and of the meth-
odologies used in scientific research may lend further support to bad theo-
ries. We are back with another aspect of the critique of economics: “the 
reliance on quantitative methods in the shape of an array of sophisticated 
statistical tools, for analysing real world phenomena. These tools may pro-
vide us with a wealth of data but perhaps very little insight and under-
standing.” 
 In this bleak picture the assumptions and the ideology of economic 
theory lead us along the windings of vicious downward spiral. 
Creating the potential for an upwards spiral 
Would different and perhaps more realistic assumptions contribute to an 
upwards movement along a more beneficial spiral, wound in the opposite 
direction of the vicious spiral?  
Take the question of motivation. Lending more weight to the assump-
tions related to intrinsic motivation, and letting these assumptions guide 
our practice, might also become self-fulfilling. If we believe that “intrinsic 
motivation energizes and sustains activities through the spontaneous satis-
factions inherent in effective volitional action” as manifested in behaviours 55 
such as play, exploration, challenge seeking.”
125 If we open the space for  
“I control” and “I value” attitudes we bring about in practice activities 
motivated intrinsically, and reduce the need for designing external motiva-
tional schemes with their inherent problems. 
Supporting this view are the experiments studying the effects of choice 
on intrinsic motivation. “The provision of choice increases the levels of 
intrinsic motivation and enhances performance on a variety of tasks.”
126 
Although there seemed to be a difference among different cultures, with 
individuals in individualistic oriented cultures being motivated to greater 
degree by the provision of choice.  
The studies are based upon experiments with individuals provided with 
different degrees of choice, thus in a way they are still kept within the nar-
row confines of how individuals may behave under certain conditions. 
What would happen if we looked at individuals working together in 
groups? In my own work I assert that giving a group of individuals latitude 
in carrying out tasks that have not, or cannot be specified very precisely, 
may enhance their intrinsic motivation. They are in control, they are chal-
lenged, they may use all of their abilities, instead of being limited to the use 
of  prescribed behaviours accompanying a certain job.
127  
We might in fact discover that reasonable people are able to orientate 
their efforts in a direction that would be more in accordance with the over-
all strivings of the institution, organisation or societies of which they were 
members. 
One problem with the ideas of encouraging performance by a perform-
ance based pay is that they are again not only assuming that we act like 
some version of a REMM man, but also that they focus on the individual, 
ignoring the man-in-a-group situations and the possibilities brought about 
not by competition but cooperation.  
“ In experiments designed to simulate the conditions of prisoner’s 
dilemma, for example, groups of human subjects typically do succeed in 
achieving a considerable degree of cooperation… At the extreme, coopera-
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tion within human groups often approaches the “ultra-sociality” of social 
insects, not excluding suicidal self-sacrifice.”
128  
The fact that real people may not behave like REMMs, that they can in 
fact show other-regarding behaviour and act in the interest of the group, 
could indicate that we have look for very different ways to encourage per-
formance. At the very least looking for alternatives to simple-minded indi-
vidual performance based incentive systems.  
Love and caring, fairness and justice, responsibility and duty, concern 
for others and empathy, generosity and gift-giving are being valued by 
most of us, and indeed it has been shown that even students of economics 
seem to possess and value some of these qualities. 
Under the term experimental economics it has become increasingly 
popular to make simple game setups to test whether we in fact possess 
some of these qualities, which would contradict the one-leggedness of neo-
classical economics. 
In contrast to some of the results of our Do ut des game the so-called 
ultimatum game shows that apparently something more than immediate 
self-interest plays a role, a sense of fairness or justice. In the game there are 
usually two players who interact in strict anonymity. The first player, the 
proposer, is offered a sum of money, under the condition that he has to 
propose how to share this sum with the second player. The second player, 
the responder, can either accept or reject the offer knowing only the rules, 
the proposal and the total amount of money involved. If the offer is rejected 
neither player gets anything, if it is accepted the proposal is carried out. 
In experiments it has been shown that the amount offered by the pro-
poser in most cases would exceed what could be expected according to ba-
sic assumptions that we have just been discussing. Sigmund, Nowak and 
Fehr
129 mention that in two thirds of the games the offer is between 40% 
and 50%. Classical economic man assumptions would led one to believe 
that no offer above zero can be too small. For the self-interested individual 
even a small amount would be better than nothing. Still in the games 
reported by Sigmund, Nowak and Fehr offers of less than 20% were 
rejected by more than half of the responders.  
                                          
128 Hirschleifer, J., & Skyrms, B. (2001). Human Cooperation. Los Angeles: Working Paper, 
Department of Economics, UCLA, p.4. 
129 Sigmund, K., Fehr, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2002). The Economics of Fair Play. Scientific 
American, 286(1), 81-85. 57 
The assumption that a rational self-interested proposer would offer only 
the smallest share and the responder accepting this is evidently not born out 
in the many ultimatum game experiments that have been carried out. On 
the contrary most players seem to value on outcomes that would give sub-
stantial share to the responder. The question is: Why is this so? 
I would expect most people to come up with a simple answer, mention-
ing fairness or sense of justice. The proposer may judge that a very small 
offer will seem unfair to the responder, and thus give more generous offers. 
The responder may in fact consider small offers unfair, thus rejecting such 
offers, which means that none of the players would get anything. The 
responder in fact foregoes the small share in order apparently to punish the 
(niggardly) behaviour of the proposer. 
It is specified that the game is played with anonymous players and it is 
specified that there are no further plays between the two players, so recip-
rocity cannot be an issue.  
What then might explain the “fair man” behaviour?  
Sigmund, Nowak and Fehr mention that the pure game has artificial 
constraints that are unequal to the interactions in the real world. “haggling 
is impossible, people do not get to know each other, the prize vanishes if 
not split on the first attempt and the game is never repeated.”
130 In their 
view this is precisely what makes it possible to study fundamental princi-
ples governing our behaviour. “ The process is somewhat like physicist 
colliding particles in a vacuum to study their properties.” There we have it 
again, the attempt to mimic physics.  
 Perhaps this is also what makes the whole experiment inexplicable 
from a pure economic view. The players are not blank human beings, they 
are human beings with a history, immersed in a society and a culture whose 
values may have been inculcated, and in which they have experiences of 
countless encounters, often reciprocal, with others. The values include a 
sense of justice and of fairness, and how are the players to strip themselves 
of these values just because it is a game.  
In a certain sense the game experiments may give us less insight into 
our values and motives than our day to day experiences in interactions with 
others. Once again: we are not just physical particles colliding and leaving 
traces in the fog chamber. We have to understand that we are not isolated 
                                          
130 Ibid. p. 82. 58 
individuals, but individuals living in and shaped by a society. Our sense of 
justice for instance does not originate in the individual, that would in itself 
be  a strange idea. It belongs to a society, that imposes a sense of justice 
upon the individual through upbringing, and interaction with others. Its 
purpose may evade the single individual, but it is essential for upholding 
any kind of society.  
Looking to both the Do-ut-es game and the ultimatum game it would 
seem that we get somewhat contradicting results. We have to remember 
though that even in the Do ut des game there were individuals who would 
stick to certain values even in the absence of gains, and without being able 
to punish the S-players.  
Adam Smith had realised that basic values were necessary in a society. 
He spoke of general rules of conduct that have been fixed in our minds by 
habitual reflection. “Without this sacred regard to general rules, there is no 
man whose conduct can be much depended upon. It is this which consti-
tutes the most essential difference between a man of principle and honour 
and a worthless fellow.”
131  
The deep seated values, conventions and sentiments may be seen as the 
lattice structure upholding a society of human beings. In a liberal society 
the lattice might be rather open and fragile leaving much latitude to indi-
vidual REMM like men. If it becomes too fragile and open it will break 
down. On the other hand a lattice cast in concrete with only very narrow 
openings in it may leave very little room for REMM’s but may also have 
very little room for growth and development. Seen in this light it may not 
be to wise to talk of “the cement of society” like Elster
132 does. 
The lattice is something that limits and directs the individual's activity, 
it is something much bigger than any individual. It may seldomly be seen 
to be in the interest of a single individual. In fact from the viewpoint of a 
REMM man it may be seen as irrational, as something constraining the in-
dividual maximising attempts. Only indirectly does it potentially benefit 
every individual in a society. 
“Cleaning up the environment and abstaining from polluting it are clas-
sical collective action problems, as are participation in community work, 
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support of museums or public radio stations, adherence to a revolutionary 
movement, honesty among tax payers or among public officials and vol-
untary donations of blood. The characteristic feature of all these cases is 
that any individual contribution generates small benefits for many people 
and large costs for one person – namely the contributor.”
133  
The lattice may thus consist of a kind of indirect cooperation, like pay-
ing taxes, voting in elections and giving blood. Actions that may cost 
something for the individual but result in small benefits for everyone in a 
society, even for the one who is doing the action. Even so the benefit for 
single individual would be too small to make REMM like men act at upon 
them. On the other hand if every one acted all would potentially get a bene-
fit. Almost like the players making C decisions in the Do ut des game. 
The lattice also consists of values like showing trust, being truthful, 
showing fairness and justice, keeping promises and honouring agreements 
and vague duties, perhaps by giving voice to unpopular opinions that one 
believes in. In a concrete situation a single REMM man might not see his 
advantage in honouring any of these values. In fact he might be better off 
by acting like Do ut des player making an S decision. Still if most people in 
society act according to these values it may benefit all of us. 
Even sentiments like love, willingness to offer everything for something 
or someone else than oneself, showing concern for others, showing empa-
thy, being generous etc. would seem to belong to the lattice. Of course in a 
certain sense love would be reciprocal, giving immediate satisfaction. In 
other cases one may give up one’s own life to save the life of others, an 
action that can hardly be seen as self-interested, as one is not to enjoy the 
benefits of the action. 
Conventions may also make up large parts of the lattice. Conventions 
like driving on the right side of the road for instance. Conventions in eve-
ryday exchanges between people, like in the use of language. Conventions 
for working hours and leisure time. Conventions for how to act in all sorts 
of situations. Of course many of these conventions may seem arbitrary, 
some other convention may seem just as good. Sometimes it is important 
just to have a convention. 
Large parts of the lattice may consist of what we call culture, which 
may include parts made up of religious shallt and shallt nots. 
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To day of course many parts of the lattice have been cast in cement as it 
were, in the shape of legal rules with a state apparatus watching over them. 
Here it may be relevant to ask whether it makes any difference that certain 
parts belong to cultural habits as it were and that other parts are cast in 
concrete in the shape of explicit legal rules. 
Yes, I believe it does as I have attempted to show elsewhere in “Beyond 
rules in society and business.”
134 Although the dividing line is not so much 
between habit versus legal rules, as between forced upon external rules and 
felt-compelled-to internal norms.  
The difference being that forced upon rules may actually mean that 
individual might have the attitudes of a REMM man, albeit a REMM man 
hemmed in and constrained by rules, or more correctly perhaps the controls 
and sanctions accompanying the rules in the shape of a coercive state appa-
ratus. In this case the REMM man may of course only feel hemmed in, in 
so far as there is large calculable risk of being caught transgressing the rule 
and be punished with heavy fine or other kinds of sanctions. If the product 
of the risk and the sanction is in some way less than the benefits that can be 
enjoyed by not observing the rule, the calculating REMM man will of 
course transgress the rule. In any case the REMM man may never abide by 
what could be called the purpose of the rule, at the most he could be forced 
to observe the letter of the law, by making transgressions potentially very 
costly for a transgressor. 
Feeling compelled to act according internalised norms is a different 
animal altogether. One may actually believe that this is the thing to do, like 
being fair, being honest, keeping agreements. Either because one has been 
brought up with these values and act according to them without really 
thinking of costs or benefits or because one upon reflection can see that this 
would be to the advantage of everyone if everyone did so. 
One of the major tasks before us is to change the mindset of all those 
who have lost their sense of universal responsibility and perhaps also of 
their own abilities. This would mean that political decision makers should 
become very wary of making all sorts of ad hoc regulations satisfying per-
haps this or that interest group or solving a small problem. Instead the 
efforts of government might be directed at encouraging self-organisation 
and self-regulation of individuals, of local communities and of businesses. 
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This would encourage and demand that individuals and organisations show 
a universal and vague responsibility, instead of giving in to requests to cre-
ate ever more areas with a limited, special and specific responsibility, or, in 
other words, institutional solutions. 
 This is a view echoed by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in the UK. 
In the report “Personal Responsibility and Changing Behaviour: the state of 
knowledge and its implications for public policy” the emphasis is on pro-
tecting and enhancing personal responsibility. 
 
-  it enables society to function with a less coercive state and judicial 
system; 
-  it enables public goods to be provided with a lower tax burden; 
-  the exercise of responsibility strengthens individual character and 
moral capacity; and 
-  greater personal responsibility – in terms of restraint and support 
for others -enhances the quality of life of the whole community
135 
 
This goes for business too. The former CEO of Novo Nordisk the Dan-
ish pharmaceutical company known for insulin products sums it up: 
“A few years ago we started an internal initiative called 'Values in 
Action'. This forms the basis for aligning our business to the economic, 
social and environmental imperatives of sustainable development.  
Through reporting and dialogue we want to gain a better understanding 
of what social responsibility means in general and to Novo Nordisk in a 
period where we operate in an increasingly complex global marketplace. 
The pace of global business is so rapid that businesses will frequently 
encounter political or cultural dilemmas earlier than politicians or regula-
tors… In our view, companies have an obligation to report on their activi-
ties in markets which may be considered 'controversial', demonstrating 
their readiness to ensure that social concerns are an integral part of their 
business strategy.
136”  
I wonder if Porter has had a similar idea: 
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“I believe we in the business world need to be more offensive. Right 
now we are apologising for the company. We are defensive, and businesses 
are engaging in corporate philanthropy to avoid scandals and to be liked. 
That is a dangerous route. Companies need to move away from defensive 
actions into a proactive integration of social initiatives into business com-
petitive strategy. Basically I think that business should be proud of what it 
is doing: business makes the economy work. The money comes from busi-
ness – not governments. Business should not try to solve all societal issues. 
It should concentrate on fairly tangible business operations, and this is what 
I refer to as the corporate competitive context. In doing so it needs to rec-
oncile the challenges from shareholders and activists at the same time.
137”  
Porter mentions examples from Cisco and Shell. Cisco makes routers 
for our broadband internet connections. They saw a lack of skilled people 
in this field and established academies to train people
138. Shell on the other 
hand engaged itself in the huge problems with erosion and destruction of 
the Mexican coastline, as a continuation of its oil exploration activities in 
the Mexican Gulf. 
Even in absence of any rules and potential sanctions internal norms 
would compel one to act in accordance with purpose of the norm, and be 
less inclined to search for possibilities for avoiding adherence to the norm. 
The norms could perhaps be compared to the grammar of language, in 
which meaningful sentences could only be expressed using the grammar, 
while the forced upon rule could be compared to a single expression that 
one is forbidden to use. I have earlier attempted to show that ethical 
judgement involves much more than following written ethical codes and 
laws regulating behaviour.
139  
It involves following an internalised ethical grammar, or a set of tacit 
norms, and a certain level of knowledge. At this intermediate level judge-
ments seem to relate to some vaguely defined norms, that we can only talk 
about in a roundabout way. They are not usually written down, but are 
expressible in a general way, like fairness or justice. They may also be lik-
ened to the tacit rules of a moderately skilful chess player, who according 
to Black is “guided by memories of his own previous successes and failures 
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and, still more importantly, by the sifted experience of whole generations 
of masters. The accessible tradition supplies defeasible general maxims, 
standardised routines for accomplishing particular subtasks, detailed mod-
els for initial deployment of pieces ... and much else.”
140  
I believe that an emphasis on the assumptions in this section and a more 
multi-facetted and complex picture of man in a society of men would con-
tribute to an upwards movement along a more beneficial spiral, wound in 
the opposite direction of the vicious spiral.  
A double helix of human development? 
We have to use the picture of double helix, because based upon what we 
have seen in the preceding two sections we may have two spirals wound 
into each other, an upwards spiral intertwined with a vicious downward 
spiral. 
My provisional conclusion would thus be that we are both REMM men 
or as well as human beings that attempt to uphold certain values that would 
make us act against our own immediate self-interest. 
We do value “Love and caring, fairness and justice, responsibility and 
duty, concern for others and empathy, generosity and gift-giving” but we 
also have to play the game that we find in the society of which we are a 
part. If this includes a preference for individual maximising behaviour we 
will to certain extent presumably feel that we have to play along. At least 
when acting in those parts of society where such behaviour is condoned, 
almost like rules of a game. 
To a large extent we may be imprintable almost like Lorenz’s geese. We 
may grow up following a cardboard box of economics around or we may 
grow up following the mother goose of deep seated values about, or per-
haps a combination of cardboard box and mother goose? Meaning that we 
can be socialised into very different social environments. Still if we want to 
uphold society there is a limit to how self-interested the imprinting can be, 
even though we may have difficulties realising just where those limits are. 
Without deep seated value and morality we would have no society, and 
with no attempts to maximise and gain an individual advantage we would 
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not have experienced the phenomenal economic and material development 
seen in Western societies. It stands to reason though that certain values and 
norms must be more basic than others if we are to uphold a society, and 
that these values must somehow curb the REMM-like behaviour presumed 
by economic models.  
Even though it  might be possible to develop  an almost Lamarckian  
inheritable one-leggedness  forced by an ideological environment of other-
worldly economic ideas and assumptions,  this one-legged theory monster 
is permanently out of balance and  will hopefully loose out in  the long 







Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Axelrod, R. (1986). An Evolutionary Approach to Norms. American 
Political Science Review, 80(4), 1095-1111. 
Barkema, H. G. (1995). Do Job Executives Work harder When They are 
Monitored? Kyklos, 48, 19-42. 
Bebchuk, L., & Fried, J. (2004). Pay Without Performance: the unfulfilled 
promise of executive compensation. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Becker, G. S. (1976). The Economic Approach to Human behavior. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Ben-ner, A., & Putterman, L. (2000). Values Matter. World Economics, 
1(1), 39-60. 
Beretning om toldkontrollen. (2001).). København: Statsrevisorerne. 
Berle, A. A., & Gardiner, C. M. (1932). The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property. New York: Macmillan. 
Black, M. (1990). Perplexities — Rational Choice, the Prisoner's Dilemma, 
Metaphor, Poetic Ambiguity, and Other Puzzles. Ithaca, N. 
Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Boettke, P. J. (1996). What is wrong with neoclassical economics. Working 
paper New York: New York University. 
Bohnet, I., Frey, B. S., & Huck, S. (2000). More Order with Less Law: on 
contract enforcement, trust, and crowding. Zurich: Working 
Paper Series, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, 
University of Zurich. 
Boschini, A. D., Lindquist, M. J., Pettersson, J., & Roine, J. (2004). 
Learning to Lose a Leg: casualties of PhD Economics 
training in Stockholm. Econ Journal Watch, 1(2, Augus 
2004), 369-379.  
Buchanan, J. M. The Limits of Liberty — between Anarchy and Leviathan. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975. 66 
Buchanan, J. M., og G. Tullock. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, 
1962. 
Byrne, D. (1998). Complexity Theory band the Social Sciences: an 
introduction. London: Routledge. 
Cadsby, C. B., & Maynes, E. (1998). Choosing between a socially efficient 
and free-riding equilibrium: nurses versus economics and 
business students. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 37, 183-192. 
COGEE (1991). Report of the Commission on Graduate Education in 
Economics. Journal of Economic Literature, xxix 
(September 1991), 1035-1053. 
Corporate Social Responsibility – Guidance for the Implementation of 
Corporate Social Responsibility. (2004).): Österreichisches 
Normungsinstitut 2004. 
CSR – a religion with too many priests? Interview with Michael Porter. 
(2003). European Business Forum Issue 15. 
Danka Starovic, Cooper, S., & Davis, M. (2005). Maximising Shareholder 
Value: Achieving clarity in decision-making: technical 
report: CIMA The Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants. 
Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value: An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic 
Equilibrium (1971 ed.). New Haven, CT.: Yale University 
Press. 
Debreu, G. (1991). The Mathematization of Economic Theory. American 
Economic review, 81(1), 1-7. 
Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic 
Motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
18(1), 105-115. 
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A Meta-Analytical 
Review of Experiments Examining Extrinsic Rewards. 
Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), 627-668. 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders DSM-IV-TR. 
(2000).Washington DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1879). The Hedonical Calculus. Mind, 4(15), 394-408.  67 
Edgeworth, F. Y. (1881). Mathematical Psychics. London: Paul Kegan.  
Elster, J. (1989). The Cement of Society - A Study of Social Order. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Ensley, M. D., & Grider, D. T. The Effect of Executive Pay Dispersion on 
Entrepreneurial Team Conflict, Cohesion, Consensus, and 
New Venture Performance. 
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer, J., & Sutton, R. I. (2003). Economics Language and 
Assumptions: how theories can become self-fulfilling: IESE 
Research Papers D/530, IESE Business School. 
Ferraro, F., Pfeffer J., & Sutton, R. I. (2005) "Economics Language and 
Assumptions: How Theories Can Become Self-Fulfilling." 
Academy of Management Review 30, 8-24. 
Fisher, I. (1892). Mathematical investigations in the theory of value and 
price, (1965 ed.). New York: A. M. Kelley. 
Fligstein, N. (2004). The End of (Shareholder Value) Ideology? Institute of 
Industrial Relations Working Paper, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
Frank, R. H. (1987). If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility 
Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience? 
American Economic Review, 77(4). 
Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T., & Regan, D. T. (1993). Does Studying 
Economics Inhibit Cooperation? Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, American Economic Association, 7(2), 159-
171. 
Frey, B. S. (2002). A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues. 
Canberra, Australia: Working Paper no 31, Centre for Tax 
System Integrity, Australian National University. 
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2000). Motivation Crowding Theory: a survey of 
empirical evidence. Munich: Working Paper, CESifo, Ifo 
Center for Economic Studies. 
Frey, B. S., & Osterloh, M. (2005). Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like 
Bureaucrats. University of Zurich: CESifo Working Paper. 
Friedman, D. (1973). The Machinery of Freedom. New York: Harper. 68 
Fukuyama, F. (1999). The Great Disruption. human nature and the 
reconstitution of social order. New York: The Free Press. 
Fullbrook, E. (Ed.). (2003). The Crisis in Economics.London: Routledge. 
Galbraith, J. K. (2001). A Contribution on the State of Economics in 
France and the World. Post-Autistic Economics 
Newsletter(4, January). 
Genetics in the Soviet Union: Three Speeches From the 1939 Conference 
on Genetics. Science and Society: 
http://www.marxists.org/subject/science/essays/speeches.ht
m. 
Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for Practice: a critique of the 
transaction cost theory. Academy of management Review, 
21(1). 
Graetz, M. J., & Wilde, L. L. (1985). The Economics of Tax Compliance: 
facts and fantasy. National Tax Journal, 38(3), 355-363. 
Hall, B. J., & Knox, T. M. (2005). Underwater Options and the Dynamics 
of Executive Pay-to-Performance Sensitivities. Journal of 
Accounting Research. Forthcoming. In Richard T. Holden, 
&. (No year). The Original Management Incentive Schemes. 
Cambridge, MA: Paper, Department of Economics, Harvard 
University. 
Halpern, D., Bates, C., Beales, G., & Heathfield, A. (2004). Personal 
Responsibility and Changing Behaviour: the state of 
knowledge and its implications for public policy: The Prime 
Minister's Strategy Unit, Cabinet Office. 
Halvårsstatus, 1. Halvår 2004, (Half-year status report 2004). (2004).). 
Ribe: Arbejdsmarkedsrådet (Labour Market Council) Ribe 
Amt. 




Hayek, F. A. (1976). Individualism and Economic Order. London: 
Routledge and Kegan. 69 
Hedge Funds Are Growing: Is This Good or Bad?): Finance and 
Investment, Wharton. 
Hirschleifer, J., & Skyrms, B. (2001). Human Cooperation. Los Angeles: 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, UCLA. 
Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan (1982 ed.). Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Richard T. Holden, &. (No year). The Original Management Incentive 
Schemes. Cambridge, MA: Paper, Department of 
Economics, Harvard University. 
Holmström, B., & Milgrom, P. R. (1987). Aggregation and Linearity in the 
Provision of Intertemporal Incentives. Econometrica, 55(2), 
308-328. 
Hume, D. (1740). A Treatise of Human Nature (1969 ed.). 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Iyengar, S. S., & DeVoe, S. E. (2001). Rethinking the Value of Choice: 
considering culturla mediators of intrinsic motivation. New 
York: Paper, Graduate School of Business, Columbia 
University. 
Jenkins. G. D. (1986). Financial Incentives. In E. A. Locke (Ed.), 
Generalizing from Laboratory to Field Settings. Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1994). The Nature of Man. Journal of 
Applied Corporate Finance, 7(2, Summer), 4-19. 
Jevons, W. S. (1866). Brief Account of a General Mathematical Theory of 
Political Economy. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
London, XXIX June, 282-287. 
Jonas, H. (1984). The Imperative of Responsibility – In search of an ethics 
for the technological age. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Justitsministeriet. (2003). Resultatlønskontrakt (Rigspolitichefen). 
København. 
Katz, N. R. (2000). Incentives and Performance Management in the Public 
Sector. Cambridge, MA: Paper, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University. 70 
Kennedy, A. (2000). The End of Shareholder Value: The Real Effects of the 
Shareholder Value Phenomenon and the Crisis it is 
Bringing to Business. Cambridge MA: Perseus Publishing. 
Keynes, J. M. (1937). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money. In The Collected Writings of J. M. Keynes (1973 
ed., Vol. VII) London: Macmillan 
Kohn, A. (1998). Challenging Behaviorist Dogma. Compensation & 
Benefits Review(March/April). 
Kruskal, W. S. (1968). Statistics: The Field. In D. Sills (Ed.), International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (pp. 206-224). New 
York: Macmillan 
Kuhn, T. S. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Lakatos, I., & Musgrave, A. (Eds.). (1975). Criticism and the growth of 
knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Lawson, T. (2001). Back to Reality. Post-Autistic Economics Newsletter(6, 
May). 
Lepper, M. P., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining 
Children's Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic Rewards: a test of 
the "overjustification" hypothesis. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 28. 
Lepper, M., & Green, D. (Eds.). (1978). The Hidden Costs of Reward: New 
perspectives on the Psychology of Human Motivation. 
Hillsdale, N.J.: Laurence Erlbaum. 
MacKenzie, D. (2003). An Equation and its Worlds: Bricolages, 
Examplars, Disunity, and Performativity in Economics. 
Edinburgh: School of Social and Political Studies.  
MacKenzie, D., & Millo, Y. (2003) "Constructing a Market, Performing 
Theory: The Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives 
Exchange." American Journal of Sociology 109, pp. 107-
145. 
Marshall, A. (1881). Review of Edgeworth's Mathematical Psychics. The 
Academy, 457.  71 
Marshall, A., & Marshall, M. P. (1879). The Economics of Industry (1881 
ed.). London: Macmillan. 
McCloskey, D. N. (1995). Metaphors Economists Live By. Social 
Research, 62(2), 215-237. 
McCloskey, D. N., & Klamer, A. (1995). One Quarter of GDP is 
Persuasion. Rhetoric and Economic Behavior, 85, 191-195. 
Meier, S., & Frey, B. S. (2004). Do Business Students make Good 
Citizens? Zurich: Working Paper, Institue for Empirical 
research in Economics, University of Zurich. 
Miller, D. T. (1999). The Norm of Self-Interest. American Psychologist, 
54(12), 1053-1060. 
Miller, D. T., & Ratner, R. K. (1998). The Disparity Between the Actual 
and Assumed Power of Self-interest. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 74(1), 53-62. 
Mintzberg, H., Simons, R., & Basu, K. (2002). Beyond Selfishness. MIT 
Sloan Management review, 44(1), 67-74. 
Mirowski, P. (1989). More Heat than Light, Economics as Social Physics, 
Physics as nature's Economics: Historical Perspectives on 
Modern Economics (1999 ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Müntefering beschimpft die Heuschrecken, Schröder will sie füttern. 
(2005, 18.04.05). Die Zeit. 
Open letter from economics students to professors and others responsible 
for the teaching of this discipline. At: 
http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/wsp.htm 
Opening Up Economics: A Proposal By Cambridge Students, The 
Cambridge 27. (2001). Post-Autistic Economics Newsletter 
(7, July). 
O'Reilly, C. A., Wade, J., & Pollock, T. (1996). Overpaid CEOs and 
Underpaid Managers: equity and executive compensation. 
Stanford, CA: Research Paper #1410, Graduate School of 
Business, Standford University. 72 
Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (1999). Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and 
Organizational Form. Zurich: Working Paper, Institute for 
Empirical research in Economics, University of Zurich. 
Petersen, V. C. (2002). Beyond Rules in Society and Business. Cheltenham, 
UK • Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
Pigou., A. C. (Ed.). (1966). Memorials of Alfred Marshall. New York: A. 
M. Kelley. 
Politiloven, Law no. 444 from 09/06/04. (2004). 
Rappaport, A. (1986). Creating Shareholder Value: A Guide for Managers 
and Investor. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Sandel, M. J. (1998). What money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of 
Markets. The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Brasenose 
College, Oxford. 
Schwartz, B. (1997). Psychology, Idea Technology, and Ideology. 
Psychological Science, 8(1). 
Sen, A. (1977). Rational Fools: A Critique of the behavioral foundations of 
economic theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4), 317-
344. 
Sen, A. (1982). Choice, Welfare and Measurement. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Sigmund, K., Fehr, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2002). The Economics of Fair 
Play. Scientific American, 286(1), 81-85. 
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and Human Behavior (1965 ed.). New York: 
Free Press. 
Smith, A. (1776). The Wealth of Nations (1974 ed.). Harmondsworth: 
Penguin. 
Smith, A. (1790). The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976 ed.). Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Sommers, A. T. (1978). A Collision of Ethics and Economics. Across the 
Board, 1(5), 14-19. 
Thompson, H. (1997). Ignorance and Ideological Hegemony: a critique of 
neoclassical economics. Journal of Interdisciplinary 
Economics, 8(4), 291-305. 73 
Stelzer, I. M. (2004). The Corporate Scandals and the American 
Capitalism. The Public Interest, National Affairs, Inc. 
(Winter).  
Vogel, T. T. (1995). The Berkeley Economics Department. Wall Street 
Journal(12/01) 
Walras, L. (1874). Éléments d'économie politique pure, ou théorie de la 
richesse sociale (Elements of Pure Economics, or the theory 
of social wealth) (W. Jaffé, Trans. 1954 ed.). Homewood, 
Ill: Richard D. Irwin. 
Weintraub, E. R. (2002). How Economics Became a Mathematical Science 
(ed.). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Welch, J. F. (2001). Straight from the Gut. New York: Warner. 
Ziliak, S. T., & McCloskey, D. N. (2004). Size matters. The Standard Error 
of Regressions in The American Economic Review. Econ 
Journal Watch, 1(2), 331-358.  











 Working Papers 
CREDO 
  1 
 
98-1    Tacit Ethics            Verner C. Petersen
    - Creation and Change 
 
 
99-3    The care less society          Verner C. Petersen 
    - or the erosion of responsibility 
 
 
99-4    Modern scientific management         Verner C. Petersen 
    - or the attempt to measure everything 
       that counts 
 
 
99-8    A Value- and Integrity-based Strategy to      Poul Bonde Jensen 
    Consolidate Organisation, Marketing, and 
    Communication 
    -  the Case of Jyske Bank 
 
 
99-9    Moral Decay in Business          Verner C. Petersen 
    Attitudes, mechanisms, and ambiguities 
 
 
99-10    Thinking with our hands          Verner C. Petersen 
    - the importance of tacit, non- 
      algorithmic knowledge 
 
 
99-12    Judging with our guts          Verner C. Petersen 
    - the importance of an 
      ineffable social grammar 
 
 
99-13    Weaving the moral fabric          Verner C. Petersen 
    - Emergence, transmission and 
      change of social values and norms 
  
 
2000-2    Containing the runaway logic        Verner C. Petersen 
    - from voices of concern to 
      responsible entrepreneurship 
 
 
2000-5  Making the leap of faith          Verner C. Petersen 
part 1 
From hierarchy to self-organisation 
 
     
2000-7    Making the leap of faith          Verner C. Petersen 
part 2 
From modern management to 
spirited, value-based leadership 
 
 
2002-1    PHD-afhandling            Poul Bonde Jensen 
Fra afhængighed til individualitet og 
differentiering 
-  om værdibaseret ledelse af bankvirksomhed 
   2 




2003-6    Metaforer, organisationer og værdier      Christian Hansen 
 
 
2003-9    Ledelse og Selvorganiserende Praksis      Christian Hansen 
 
 
2004-3    Emerging organisations – An experiment to investigate  Björk Sigurgeirsdóttir 
    the emergence of an organisation        Ingibjörg Siguroardóttir 
                  Jelle Wichman 
                  Lotte Gydesen 
 
 
2005-13   The otherworldly view of economics      Verner C. Petersen 





ISBN 87-7882-111-8 (print) 
ISBN 87-7882-112-6 (online) 
 
Department of  Management and International Business 
Aarhus School of Business 
Fuglesangs Allé 4 
DK-8210 Aarhus V - Denmark 
 
Tel. +45 89 48 66 88 
Fax +45 86 15 01 88 
 
www.asb.dk  
 